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INTRODUCTION

Almost as quickly as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection came to be recognized as a
significant medical problem, legal and political authorities recognized that the
health care crisis raised significant problems that needed to be addressed by both
the public health law and civil liberties law. The public health law concerns
were readily apparent in the form of a need for statutory authority to achieve
epidemiological objectives, to halt transmission through education and voluntary
compliance, and to employ coercive measures where necessary. At the same
time, given the potential for discrimination for a medical condition that
disproportionately affected minority communities including homosexuals, racial
minorities, and intravenous drug users required protective measures aimed at
confidentiality and informed consent for HIV-antibody testing. While the
individual states developed special legislation that attempted to reconcile public
health and civil liberty concerns, the need for national civil rights legislation
protecting those affected by HIV-infection and AIDS became increasingly
apparent. Initial protection from discrimination was provided to individuals with
AIDS and HIV infection by inclusion within the category of persons protected
by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. However, protection was largely limited to
prohibitions of discrimination in federal employment and to those employed in
organizations receiving federal funding. Some consideration was given to
enacting legislation specifically protecting those with IiV-infection or AIDS
from unjustified discrimination; however, the political obstacles to enacting
specific AIDS-related civil rights legislation appeared formidable. Therefore, the
decision was made to develop broad general legislation protecting the disabled
from inappropriate discrimination and within this general anti-discrimination
legislation to provide protection to persons with AIDS or HIV. This approach
to a general anti-discrimination statute resulted in the Americans with Disability
Act (ADA). While other legislation such as the Fair Housing Act and the
education of the Handicapped Act were interpreted to provide protection for
certain specific groups of persons with AIDS and HIV-infection, the general
population affected by these conditions have found federal protection from
discrimination under the terms of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
Rather than specifically identify particular disease conditions which gave rise
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to anti-discrimination protection, the American with Disabilities Act took the
form of general legislation and adopted the broad textual language including the
use of such terms as "disability" and "physical or mental impairments" and
"substantially limits one or more major life activities."' Such broad textual
language has resulted in the development of a significant history of
administrative agency legal analyses and judicial opinions addressing whether
the medical condition and the resulting effects of AIDS and HIV infection
qualify the infected individual for protection under the ADA. Issues of
legislative history, implementing agency authority, and judicial approaches to
statutory interpretation along with medical and scientific evidence have provided
the rich texture for a complex history of the undertaking to provide national civil
rights protection to persons with AIDS and HIV-infection, whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic. Although the United States Supreme Court only recently has
undertaken an effort to determine the extent of the protection provided to persons
with AIDS and HIV infection, the Court's opinion did not definitely answer the
question of whether all persons with AIDS or HIV infection qualify for
protection under the American with Disabilities Act. Broad issues remain as to
whether Congress achieved its intent to adopt effective national civil rights
legislation protecting all persons with AIDS or HIV infection when it enacted the
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990.
I. INFECTION wiTH HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS

The reported history of HIV and the resulting condition of AIDS began in
1981 with articles in medical journals describing outbreaks ofpneumonitis carina
pneumonia and kaposi's sarcoma in homosexual men with apparently
malfunctioning immune systems.2 By 1983, what we now know as HIV was
isolated and determined to be the causal agent in producing AIDS.
HIV infection results in selective depletion of the human body's Tlymphocytes or CD4+ cells, the helper white blood cells, that are a primary part
of the human's immune system.4 The destruction of the CD4+ cells and the
resulting decline in the functioning of the immune system makes the body
susceptible to secondary infection.

1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
2. See Michael S. Gottlieb et al., Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal
Candidiasis in Previously Healthy Homosexual Men: Evidence of a New Acquired Cellular
Immunodeficiency, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425 (1981); Kenneth B. Hymes et al., Kaposi's
Sarcoma in Homosexual Men-A Report of Eight Cases, LANCET, Sept. 19, 1981, at 598.
3. See Francoise Barre-Sinoussi et al.,
Isolation ofa T-Lymphotropic Retrovirusfrom a
Patient at Risk for Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 SCi. 868 (1983); John
Coffin et al., Human Immunodeficiency Viruses, 232 SCl. 697 (1986); Robert C. Gallo et al.,

FrequentDetection andIsolationofCytopathicRetrovirus(HTL V-III)from PatientswithAIDS and
at Riskfor AIDS, 224 SCl. 500 (1984).
4.

See Jay A. Levy, Human Immunodeficiency Viruses andthe PathogenesisofAIDS, 261

JAMA 2997 (1989).
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During the early history of the AIDS epidemic the course of the disease
complex was conceptualized as involving acute or primary infection, initial
infection followed by a latent period after which activation of viral reproduction
resulted first in AIDS-related complex (ARC) leading to systemic AIDS. 5 The
initial infection is often accompanied by fevers, skin eruptions, myalgias,
arthrolgious, malaise, swollen glands, sore throats, gastrointestinal symptoms,
and headaches.6 These physical symptoms will often subside for a significant
period oftime. However, when subsequent viral replication becomes significant,
the patient often experiences persistent generalized lymphadenopathy (swollen
glands) as well as fatigue, skin rash, fever, diarrhea, muscle pain, night sweats,
and weight loss.7 Patients with these symptoms formerly were diagnosed as
having ARC.' A person can be diagnosed as having AIDS when the person's
CD4+ count declines below 200 cells/MM3 of blood or when CD4+ cells
comprise less than fourteen percent of the normal total of lymphocytes.9 With
AIDS, the various physical symptoms described above continue, the CD4+ cell
count further declines, and the patient experiences various opportunistic
infections and diseases such as pneumocystis, carinii pneumonia, kaposi's
sarcoma, and non-Hodgkin lymphoma."°
Increasingly HIV/AIDS is understood as a continuing spectrum of infection
following an established progression which may be delayed by available
medication. The initial progression of infection may not be accompanied by
observable physical symptoms and, thus, is often denominated as the
"asymptomatic" phase. What was earlier thought of as a latency period of time
when the virus was inactive, is now understood to involve a migration of the
virus from the circulatory system into the lymph nodes with a disappearance of
overt physical symptoms, but with measurable viral replication. 2 However, even
during this so-called asymptomatic stage, many persons continue to manifest
bacterial infections, skin disorders, and lymphadenopathy."3
By mid- 1997, the CDC reported that 612,078 individuals had been diagnosed
5. See William A. Haseltine, Silent HIV Infections, 320 NEw ENG. J.MED. 1487 (1989).
6. See Robert R. Redfield & Donald S. Burke, HIVInfection: The ClinicalPicture, 259
Scl. AM. 90 (1988).
7. See Yarchoan & Pluda, ClinicalAspects of Infection with AIDS Retro Virus, in AIDS:
ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 112 (DeVita et al. eds., 2d ed. 1988).
8. See Koenig & Fauci, AIDS Immunopathogenesis and Immune Responses, in AIDS:
ETHIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 61-71.
9. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 1993 Revised ClassificationSystemfor
HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definitionalfor AIDS Among Adolescents and
Adults, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. RR-17, Dec. 18, 1992.
10. See THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 4.1-9 (P.T. Cohen et al eds., 2d ed. 1994).
11. See Michael S. Saag, Clinical Spectrum of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Diseases,
in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 205-06 (DeVita et al. eds., 4th ed.

1997).
12.

See THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE, supra note 10, at 4.1-4, 4.1-8.

13.

See id at 4.1-9.
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with AIDS in the United States.' 4 In 1996, the CDC estimated that there were
239,000 persons living with an AIDS diagnosis.'" The CDC estimated that there
are more than one million HIV-positive people living in the United States, this
means that there were more than 750,000 HIV-infected persons who may have
been asymptomatic.' 6
II. HIV-RELATED DISCRIMINATION AND DISABILITY LAW

Discrimination against HIV-infected persons has its origins in a complex of
fears, phobias, and prejudices. Fear of contagion is the most often expressed
concern by those accused of discrimination. Nevertheless, the fact that persons
with HIV-infection may be disproportionately discriminated against as compared
to members of otherwise discriminated against groups, such as gay men or people
of color, is often cited as a basis for the need of legal protection against
discrimination.
The development of legislation to combat discrimination against HIVinfected persons has an equally multi-faceted objective. Such laws have the
purpose of ending discrimination against persons with a significant disability and
bringing
such persons within the economic and social mainstream of American
7
life.'
Another significant concern about discrimination against HIV-infected
persons arose out of the public health strategies developed to trace and stop the
spread of HIV. Educational efforts to change behavior to prevent the transfer of
the virus from one person to another and blood testing programs, aimed at
informing individuals of their infected status, required the voluntary involvement
of potentially infected persons who would be discouraged from such voluntary
testing if they feared possible discrimination based on their infected status by
those who might learn of it. This concern was reflected in the 1988 Report of the
Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic that
reported:
HIV-related discrimination is impairing this nation's ability to limit the
spread of the epidemic. Crucial to this effort are epidemiological studies
to track the epidemic as well as the education, testing, and counseling of
those who have been exposed to the virus. Public health officials will
not be able to gain the confidence and cooperation of infected
individuals or those at high risk for infection if such individuals fear that
they will be unable to retain their jobs and their housing, and that they
will be unable to obtain the medical and support services they need
because of discrimination based on a positive HIV antibody test.'8

14.

15.
16.
17.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HIV/AIDS, June 1997, at 3.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HIV/AIDS, Dec. 1996.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HIV/AIDS, Feb. 1993, at 15.
See S. REP.NO. 116, at2(1989).

18. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
EPIDEMIC 19 (1988).

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

788

[Vol. 33:783

Both houses of Congress relatively quickly endorsed the conclusion of the
Presidential Commission that:
As long as discrimination occurs, and no strong national policy with
rapid and effective remedies against discrimination is established,
individuals who are infected with IV will be reluctant to come forward
for testing, counseling, and care. This fear of potential discrimination
...will undermine our efforts to contain the HIV epidemic and will
leave HV-infected individuals isolated and alone. 9
By the time of the issuance of the Report of the President's Commission on
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, the reality of discrimination against persons
with AIDS and HIV infection was manifest. Children were excluded from
schools because of their AIDS diagnosis,20 tenants were discriminated against in
housing because of their HIV infection,2 ' patients were denied medical treatment
because of their sero-positive status,' and individuals were denied employment
or fired because they were determined to be at risk or to have AIDS.' Advocates
and public interest groups sought to protect persons with AIDS as a basis in
existing law or suggested the passage of new legislation. Some states passed
legislation to protect the rights of individuals from compelled testing and to
provide protection of the confidentiality of HIV testing records or AIDS
diagnostic records.2 ' At the federal level, civil rights laws provided one
alternative. Neither homosexuals nor intravenous drug users, two groups that
experienced a high rate of HIV infection, were protected by existing antidiscrimination laws. While there were some efforts to enact a specific HIVrelated civil rights law,' there were strong views in Congress, voiced by such
persons as Senator Helms, which argued against creating any laws creating
special rights for persons with AIDS. The public hysteria about AIDS made
passage of any protective civil right legislation at the federal level unlikely if not

19. S. REP.NO. 116, at 8(1989) (quoting REPORTOFTHEPRESIDENTIAL CoMMIsSIoNoNTHE
HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 119 (1988)); H.R. No. 101-485, at 31 (1990).
20. See, e.g., In re District 27 Community Sch. Bd., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)
(involving suit by school age HIV-infected child excluded from public school).
21. See, e.g., Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (refusal to rent
to an individual believed to be at high risk for AIDS).
22. See, e.g., Rosaline Gagliano, When HealthCare Workers Refuse to TreatAIDS Patients,
21 J. HEALTH & HOSe. L. 225 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Jane Howard Carey & Megan M. Arthur, The DevelopingLaw on AIDS in the
Workplace, 46 MD. L. REv. 284 (1987).

24.

See, e.g., 1987 ALA. ACT 574; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20-199.23 (West

1989); FLA. STAT.

§ 381.609 (West 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. ch. 325; ILL. REV. STAT. ch 11 1A,

7408 (1993); ME REv. STAT. tit. T, § 17001; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 111 § 70 (West 1989);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1994); 1987 OR. LAWS ch. 600; R-I. LAWS § 5-5-37.3
(1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.15, 146.0231 146.025 (West 1989).
25.

See, e.g., S. 1575, 100th Cong. (1987).
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impossible. Instead, attention was directed at finding a basis for antidiscrimination protection in existing law. This view, which ultimately prevailed,
was adopted in the 1988 report of the President's Commission that urged that
"persons with HIV infection should be considered members of the group of
persons with disabilities, not as a separate group onto themselves. Persons with
HIV infection deserve the same protections as all other persons with disabilities,
including those with cancer, cerebral palsy and epilepsy."26
Even prior to the recommendations of the Presidential Commission,
commentators urged the use of handicap legislation," particularly section 504 of
the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 that prohibited handicap discrimination,
and state laws that protected handicapped individuals from employment
discrimination. 9 Handicap discrimination law seemed an appropriate basis for
protection for HIV-infected individuals because these statutes, particularly the
federal handicap law, were given broad interpretation by the courts. The courts'
interpretations extended protection to individuals vulnerable to discrimination
due to impairments that resulted in shunning and avoidance by members of the
general society."
III. REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973

The history of disability law is a relatively short one, beginning
approximately twenty-five years ago with the passage of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. 3' However, the first major federal statute protecting individuals with
disabilities was the Social Security Act of 193532 that included provisions
providing medical and therapeutic services for crippled children. Other
legislation was enacted that provided rehabilitation services aimed at
employability,33 handicap accessability to federal buildings,34 and mass

26.

REPORT OF THE PRESmENTIAL COMSSION ON THE HUMAN IMmUNODEFICIENCY VIRus

EPIDEMIC 121 (1988).

27. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS andEmployment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv.
11 (1985); Arthur S. Leonard, Employment DiscriminationAgainst Persons with AIDS, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 681 (1985) [hereinafter Leonard, Employment Discrimination].
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).

29.

See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. GOV'T CODE §

12920 (West 1992).

30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987) (epilepsy a handicap); Duran
v City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (individual formerly diagnosed with epilepsy
protected because he was regarded as having an impairment); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. §§ 790-96 (1994) (epilepsy treated as handicap).

31.

29 U.S.C. §§ 790-96.

32.

42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06.

33.

See LaFollitte-Barden Act, Pub. L. No. 78-113, 57 Stat. 374 (1943), amended by the

Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments, Pub. L. No. 83-565, 68 Stat. 652 (1954) (current version
at 29 U.S.C.§ 37-42).
34. See Architectural Barriers Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-57.
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transportation."
The most significant initial disability legislation that has had importance in
dealing with WIV-related discrimination is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
aimed at handicap discrimination in programs involving federal funding. 6 The
three major provisions of the statute relating to different aspects of federal
involvement in programs included: section 501 which established nondiscrimination and affirmative action as employment requirements for federal
employers;" section 503 which mandated nondiscrimination and affirmative
action in the employment policies of federal contractors; 38 and section 504 which
mandated nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation by recipients of
federal financial assistance, including educational programs, public
accommodations, transportation, and health and social services.39
The 1973 Rehabilitation Act protected handicapped individuals who were
defined as individuals who could benefit from rehabilitation services.4' The 1974
amendments to the Rehabilitation Act expanded the definition of handicapped
individuals to include any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment. 4'
Initially, the passage of the Rehabilitation Act was not followed by strong
enforcement. Public pressure compelled the President issue an Executive Order
in 1976.2 This order mandated that the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) issue regulations implementing the provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act. In 1978, HEW promulgated regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended. 3
The
The statute's definitional terms were refined by the HEW."
promulgated regulations defined a "physical or mental impairment" as involving
the following:
(A)

any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal; special sense organs,
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; heric and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine; or

35.

See Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-18.

36.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-96.

37.
38.

See id. § 791.
See id. § 793.

39. See id. § 794.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. § 706.
See id. § 706(7)(B).
Exec. OrderNo. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
See Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978).
See Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
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(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or
45
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
The analysis published along with these regulations provided a list of covered
diseases and conditions with a warning that the list was not comprehensive."'
The listed diseases and conditions included "orthopedic, visual, speech, and
hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
and... drug addiction and alcoholism."' 7
The HEW regulations further specified that major life activities include, but
are not limited to, "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."'
The term "substantially limits" was not defined in the regulation because it was
concluded that an operating definition was not possible. 9
IV.. EXTENDING PROTECTION OF SECTION 504 OF THE FEDERAL
REHABILITATION ACT TO PERSONS WITH HIV INFECTION

OR AIDS DIAGNOSIS

A. Initial Commentary and Department ofJustice Opinion
The initial arguments for extension of the protection of individuals with HIV
infection or AIDS under the disability discrimination prohibitions of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were presented in law reviews. Arthur Leonard of
New York Law School published an article in 1985 entitled Employment
Discrimination Against Personswith AIDS." Leonard argued an individual with
AIDS should be held to be included within the statute's first definition as a
person who "has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities."'" According to Leonard, infection
with HIV constitutes a physical impairment that affected the person's
"ability... to fight infection and preserve health" that is logically a major life
function.52
Leonard also argued that a person with AIDS was protected within the third
alternatives definition of handicapped individual in the Rehabilitation Act that
protects a person who "is regarded as having such a impairment." '3 According

45.
of Justice
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

45 C.F.R. 84.30)(2Xi) (1999); see also 28 C.F.R. 41.3 l(bXl) (where the Department
promulgated identical definition regulations implementing Executive Order 12,250).
See 45 C.F.R. 84, app. A.
Id.
45 C.F.R. 84.3 (j)(2)(ii); see also 28 C.F.R. 41.21(bX2).
45 C.F.R. 84, app. A at 310.
Leonard, Employment Discrimination, supra note 27.
Id. at 691 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(BXi) (1994)).
Id at 696.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(iii).
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to Leonard, persons who may or may not be infected with HIV, and who were
denied employment because of the employer's perception that the person was
infected with the virus that causes AIDS, should be held to be protected because
such a person falls within the provision of the statute that protects persons who
are regarded as handicapped because they are perceived as having AIDS. Thus
according to Leonard, asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals, whether or not
they were in fact substantially impaired, were protected by legislation whose
purpose was to prevent discrimination that took the form of "animus against a
class of individuals which unfairly ignores their individual qualifications and is
' Leonard's understanding of the
based on prejudicial beliefs about the class."54
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, as well as his understanding of AIDS,
allowed him to dismiss the need to establish an impairment resulting from HIV
infection at the asymptomatic stage, and to avoid the need to identify any specific
life activity significantly impacted as a result of HIV infection. For Leonard, a
person who was thought to be infected with HIV was a person thought to have
AIDS, a condition by its very nature affected the person's ability to fight
infection or preserve health.
A very different view of the coverage of the-Federal Rehabilitation Act was
taken in the 1986 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on the
application of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to persons who have or are
regarded as having AIDS, ARC, or who test positive for "AIDS antibodies."55
The 1986 Department of Justice ("DOJ") Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum
concluded that section 504 prohibited discrimination based on the disabling
effects of AIDS and the related conditions that a person with AIDS can have. On
the other hand, the DOJ Memorandum concluded that an individual's real or
perceived ability to transmit "the disease" [virus] did not constitute a handicap,
and that discrimination on such basis did not fall within section 504.
The 1986 DOJ Memorandum took specific care to distinguish persons with
AIDS from those merely infected with the "AIDS virus" based on the formal
CDC case definition of AIDS, as of August 1, 1985:
A person is not considered to have AIDS merely because tests show him
to be generating antibodies to the to the AIDS virus, Le., to be
"seropositive." Instead a person is not considered to have AIDS even if
he is seropositive, and also displays a number of symptoms characteristic
of the disease. Rather, an essential element of the definition of AIDS
used for reporting purposes by the Centers for Disease Centers ("CDC")
is afflicted with one or more of the opportunistic diseases that take
advantage of the patient's suppressed immune systems.m
The 1986 DOJ Memorandum easily concluded that the disabling effects of

54.

Leonard, Employment Discrimination, supra note 27, at 696.

55. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of Section 504
of Rehabilitation Act to persons with AIDS, Daily Law Rep. (BNA) No. 122 at D-1 (June 25, 1986)
[hereinafter DOJ Memorandum].
56. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 55, at nn. 16, 17 and accompanying text.
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AIDS qualified it as a handicap. Citing the HHS interpretative regulations, the
DOJ Memorandum determined that AIDS is a "physiological disorder or
condition" affecting the "hemic.[blood] and lymphatic" systems and possibly
affecting the brain and central nervous system as well." The DOJ Memorandum
went on to conclude that this impairment substantially limited a major life
activity; namely, the inability of"resisting disabling and ultimately fatal diseases,
and may directly cause brain damage and disorders . . . [and] by definition

involves the presence of an opportunistic disease, such as P. carinii pneumonia,
that frequently will entail substantial limitations on major life activities.""8
While not specifically using the terminology "asymptomatic" in referring to
a class of HIV-infected persons, the DOJ Memorandum directed considerable
attention to what it characterized as an "immune carrier" or a person who was in
the stage of the disease progression in which the infected person was able "to
communicate the disease to another person" without otherwise experiencing "the
disability effects" of AIDS."' The medical consensus today is that there are no
immune carriers of the HIV virus. Therefore, we understand that a person who
tests positive for the HIV virus is "infected" and "infectuous." Previously, some
medical authorities maintained that a positive HIV-antibody test meant only that
the individual had been exposed to the virus. Ultimately, the DOJ Memorandum
asserts there is no distinction to be drawn between an immune carrier and a
carrier who will subsequently develop the diseases characteristic symptoms.'
The DOJ Memorandum concluded that an "immune carrier" would not have a
physical or mental impairment: "[T]he carrier's condition-the presence within
his body of the active infectious agent-has no physical consequence for him.'6
Moreover, the DOJ Memorandum went on to argue that even if the carrier of the
virus had an impairment it does not substantially limit any of the major life
activities listed in the "HHS regulation-i.e., caring for [him]self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working."62 Specifically, the DOJ Memorandum rejected the fact that the carrier
of the "AIDS virus" was subjected to social or professional discrimination.
According to the view of the DOJ Memorandum, a person cannot be regarded as
handicapped simply because others shun him; otherwise, personal traits such as
ill-temper and poor personal hygiene would constitute a handicap in
contradiction to the applicable HHS regulations.63
The 1986 DOJ Memorandum drew a significant distinction between HIVinfected persons, for example distinguishing those with physically apparent
symptoms and those whose infection was not apparent to the casual observer, in
applying the third definitive category of perceived or regarded as having an
57.

Id. (applying 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(jX2Xi) (1984)).

58.

Id. at n.65 and accompanying text.

59. Id. at n.67 and accompanying text.
60. See id. at n.71 and accompanying text.
61. Id at n.66 and accompanying text.
62. Id. (applying 45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1986)).
63. See id (citing 45 C.F.R. 84, App. A at 310).
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impairment. Even though an FIV-infected person ["a person who tests positive
for HTLV - - III/LAV antibodies"] does not have an impairment that
substantially limits any major life activity, the DOJ Memorandum does conclude:
"this person may still be handicapped under section 504 if he is perceived as
suffering from the disabling effects of AIDS or ARC."' However, the DOJ
Memorandum reiterates that neither the ability to communicate the virus nor the
incorrect belief that the individual can communicate the virus constitute a
handicap. The DOJ Memorandum goes on to concede that in certain
circumstances a person who is not infected with HIV may be protected by the
Rehabilitation Act even though they clearly do not have any impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. According to the DOJ Memorandum,
"[I]f such an individual is inaccurately perceived as suffering from the disabling
effects of AIDS or ARC---perhaps because of membership in a high risk
groups-this perceived impairment would constitute a handicap."6'
B. The Arline Opinion of the United States Supreme Court and
the Second DepartmentofJustice Opinion
The United States Supreme Court in 1987 decided the case of School Board
of Nassau County, Floridav.Arline." The Court held that a school teacher
diagnosed with contagious tuberculosis was a "handicapped individual" within
the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.67 While the Court
did not specifically address the subject of AIDS or HIV infection," the opinion
in Arline played a pivotal role in the development of federal disability law as
applied to AIDS and HIV infections because of the communicable nature of HIV.
Gene Arline, an elementary school teacher, was discharged in 1979 by the
School Board of Nassau County that employed her after she experienced a third
relapse of tuberculosis within a two year period.69 Prior to being terminated,
Arline had twice been suspended with pay in 1978 after testing positive for
tuberculosis. At the close of the 1978-1979 school year, Arline was discharged
because of her medical condition.7"
While concluding that the plaintiff suffered a handicap, the district court held
that she was not a "handicapped person" within the meaning of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The district court found it "difficult... to conceive that
Congress intended contagious diseases to be included within the definition of a
handicapped person."'" The district court went on to hold that even if a person
with a contagious disease could be deemed a handicapped person, Arline was not

64.
65.

Id (applying 29 U.S.C. § 706(7XBXiii)).
Id. at n.75 and accompanying text.

66. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
67.

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).

68.

See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.

69.

See id. at 276.

70.

See id.
Id. at 277 (citation omitted).

71.
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qualified to teach because she had a contagious disease that might be
communicated to her students or fellow teachers.'
On appeal, the Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court decision and held that a person with a contagious disease is handicapped
within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.73 The court of
appeals remanded the case for findings with respect to the questions whether
there were actual risks of infection that would preclude Arline from being.
qualified for the teaching job, and if so, whether the school could reasonably
accommodate her in a non-teaching job or other position.
Affirming the Eleventh Circuit, the United States Supreme Court (7-0) held
that Arline was handicapped within the meaning of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.74 The Court's opinion directed attention at the regulations
promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) that define the terms used in the Rehabilitation Act's statutory definitions
of handicapped individuals, specifically "physical impairment" and "major life
activities."" The Court noted that impairment is defined as including any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
which affects one or more specified body systems.76 The Court also took note
that specified major life activities include "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.""
The Court concluded that Arline "had a physical impairment," as that term
is defined in the Department of Health and Human Services Regulation because
she had a physiological disorder or condition that affected her respiratory
system.' The fact that Arline was hospitalized in 1957 because of the same
impairment was sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life activities
were substantially limited by her impairment, and her previous hospitalizations
also established that Arline had a record of such impairment within the
definitional terms of the Rehabilitation Act.
The defendant school board conceded that a contagious disease could
constitute an impairment to the extent that a person's physical or mental
capacities were diminished, and further conceded that Arline's hospitalization in
1975 for tuberculosis established a record of physical impairment. However, the
defendant argued that this impairment and record of impairment were irrelevant
since Arline was terminated, not because of her diminished physical or mental
capacity, but because of the threat of contagion that her tuberculin condition
posed to others.
72.

See id.

73. See Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), affd, 480
U.S. at 273.
74. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 273.
75. Id. at 281 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.30X2)(i), (ii) (1984)).
76. See id at 280 (citing § 84.30)(2)(i)).
77. Id. (citing § 84.3(jX2Xii)).

78. Id.at 282.
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The Court majority rejected the School Board's arguments on the basis that
the unobservable effects of a contagious or communicable disease on an
individual cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the disease's physical
effects on the infected person.79 The Court reasoned that Arline's contagiousness
and her physical impairment resulted from the same condition and that it would
be unfair to allow employers to rely on a distinction between the effects of a
disease on a patient and the effects of the disease on others to justify
discrimination. The Court noted that prejudicial attitudes, ignorance, myths, and
fears about disability, disease, and contagiousness were meant to be eliminated
by the Rehabilitation Act's enforcement based on reasoned and medically sound
judgments. The Court emphasized, "[T]he fact that some persons who have
contagious diseases may pose a serious health threat to others under certain
circumstances does notjustify excluding from the coverage of the Act all persons
with actual or perceived contagious diseases."' 0
Turning to the question of whether Arline was otherwise qualified as an
elementary school teacher, the Court found a need to remand the case to the
district court for a determination as to whether Arline was otherwise qualified.
The Court provided some guidance by instructing the district court that in making
findings of fact with regard tojob qualification, the district court should normally
defer to the reasonable judgments of public health officials.8' The Court made
it clear, however, that a person who poses a significant risk of communicating on
infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be found qualified for
employment if reasonable accommodation would not eliminate that risk. 2 On
remand, the district court held that Arline was an otherwise qualified person
under the Rehabilitation Act and ordered that she be reinstated to her position as
a school teacher.8 3
Even atthe time thatArlinewas being argued in the Supreme Court, an effort
was made to determine the significance ofthe opinion for persons with AIDS and
HIV infection. In fact, the question of whether AIDS constitutes a handicapped
under the Rehabilitation Act implicitly was raised by the United States, appearing
as amicus curiae. The Solicitor General argued that it is possible for an
individual to be a carrier of a disease, "that is, to be capable of spreading a
disease without having a 'physical impairment' or suffering from any symptoms
associated with the disease."" Asserting that this was an accurate description of
carriers of the "AIDS virus," the Solicitor General argued that discrimination
solely on the basis of contagion could never constitute discrimination on the
basis of handicap. This is, of course, a central argument made in the 1986
Memorandum of the Department ofJustice's Office ofLegal Counsel." Both the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.

See id.
Id. at 285.
See id. at 288.
See id.
See Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
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position of Solicitor General and the 1986 DOJ Memorandum were based on
what is known to be the mistaken position that there are carriers of HIV who are
not themselves infected and experiencing the effects of such infection on the
compromise of their immune system and reduction in their white blood cell
count. The Court, however, found it unnecessary to address the Solicitor
General's argument because the disease at issue inArline, tuberculosis, involved
both physical impairment and contagiousness. Thus, the Court concluded, "[W]e
therefore, do not reach the question whether a carrier of a contagious disease
such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether
such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagion, a
handicapped person as defined by the [Rehabilitation] Act.""
The Legal Counsel's office of the Department of Justice was asked in 1988
to revisit the question of the applicability of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 to persons infected with HIV in light of the opinion of the United States
Supreme. In a memorandum of September 27, 1988, an opinion was offered that
section 504 protects symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals
against discrimination in any covered program or activity on the basis of any
actual, past or perceived effect of HIV infection that substantially limits any
major life activity (1) in the non-employment context, so long as the HIV
infected individual is "otherwise qualified to participate in the program or
activity; and (2) in the employment context so long as the HIV infected
individual is able to perform the duties of the job and does not constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of others.8 7 This latter distinction reflects the terms
of the Civil Rights Restoration Act which replaced the "otherwise qualified"
standard with the formulation set out above.8"
The 1986 DOJ Memorandum specifically supercedes the 1986 opinion from
Charles Cooper."9 Persons with HIV infection are characterized as either
symptomatic HIV-infected individuals, including persons with AIDS or ARC, or
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals. The memorandum adopts the position
that available medical information established that HIV infection is a physical
impairment which in any given case may substantially limit a person's major life
activities; in addition, the memorandum recognized that others may regard an
HIV-infected person as being so impaired. 9 The memorandum also responded
to the issue raised by the discussion in the Arline opinion of whether there are
carriers of the "AIDS virus" that do not have any physical impairment: "By
86. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
87. See Memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas Kamiec on
Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-infected Persons, Daily Law Rep. (BNA)
No. 195 at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988) [hereinafter DOJ Memorandum-lI].
88. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259 § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32
(1988) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 706) (precluded attempt to remove contagious disease from the
definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act and codified in part the holding in Arline).
89. See DOJ Memorandum II,supra note 87, at n.4.
90. See id.
at n.2.
91. See id.
at n.3.

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:783

virtue of the fact that the handicap here, HIV infection, given rise both to
disabling physical symptoms and to contagiousness."' The memorandum
concluded, "[T]he medical information available to us undermined the accuracy
of the assumption or contentions referenced in Arline that carriers of the AIDS
virus are without physical symptoms."' 3
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum concluded that all symptomatic HIV-infected
individuals are handicapped under section 504. 94 This conclusion was based on
the finding that in symptomatic patients or patients with AIDS, HIV infection
has progressed to the point where the immune system has been sufficiently
weakened so that opportunistic infection or disease, such as cancer or
pneumonia, has developed. According to the DOJ view, the substantial limiting
effects that the clinical symptoms have on many major life handicaps are such
that every symptomatic HIV-infected person is an individual with handicaps for
purposes of section 504.
Asymptomatic HIV-infection is given greater attention in the 1988 DOJ
Memorandum since the author of the opinion recognized that Arline did not
resolve the application of section 504 to asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals.' The DOJ Memorandum identifies the three areas of inquiry
required to determine whether an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual is a
person with a handicap. These include: (1) whether HIV infection by itself is a
physical or mental impairment; and (2) whether this impairment substantially
limits a major effect, i.e., whether it has a disabling effect; or (3) whether an
individual with HIV infection is regarded as having an impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity."
The DOJ Memorandum places heavy reliance on the views expressed by the
Public Health Service, especially by the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service, Dr. C. Everett Koop, in deciding whether HIV-infection alone is an
impairment, i.e., whether the asymptomatic HIV-infected individual has an
impairment. Dr. Koop reported that HIV infection is the starting point of a single
disease process that progresses through a continuum of stages, rather then
involving a series of discrete illness. The Surgeon General concluded that "from
a purely scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection are clearly
impaired." According to Dr. Koop, asymptomatic HIV infected persons are not
comparable to immune carriers of a contagious disease such as hepatitis B. Like
a person in the early stages of cancer, asymptomatic HIV infected persons may
appear outwardly healthy, but are in fact seriously ill." '
92.

Id.

93.
94.
95.

Id.
See id at (IIXA).
See id. at n.8.

96.

See id.

97.

Id. (citing letter of Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to Acting Assistant Attorney

General Douglas Kmiec).
98. Id. (citing letter of Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to Acting Assistant Attorney
General Douglas Kmiec).
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In order to determine the meaning of the statutory term "physical
impairment," the 1988 DOJ Memorandum placed specific reliance on the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services
defining the term as:
[A]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive,
genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine."
In addition to the regulations, the 1988 DOJ Memorandum noted the existence
of an appendix to the HHS regulations that provided an illustrative, although not
exhaustive, list of diseases and conditions that are "physical impairments" for
purposes of section 504: "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, cancer and heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation [and]
emotional illness, and... drug addiction and alcoholism."'"
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum proceeded to apply the HHS regulations and
commentary to the factual description given by the Surgeon General of the
condition of the asymptomatic HIV-infected individual, concluding that this
medical condition meets the HIHS definition of "physical impairment" because
it is a "physiological disorder or condition" which affects the "hemic and
lymphatic" systems of the HIV-infected individual.''
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum moved on to the second question: whether the
impairment caused by HIV-infection substantially limits any major activities in
the asymptomatic individual. The author of the memorandum found some
guidance in the illustrative, but not exhaustive, HHS regulations implementing
section 504 which define "major life activities" to include such functions as
"caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working."' 2 The 1988 DOJ Memorandum
acknowledged that it is not so readily apparent that asymptomatic, HIV-infected
persons are substantially limited in major life activities because they have no
obvious disabling physical effects resulting from their HIV infection. These
asymptomatic individuals appear able to work, to care for themselves, to perform
manual tasks, and fully to use their senses.
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum identified procreation and intimate personal
relations as two of the most significant major life activities substantially limited
by IV infection. 3 Although these activities are not listed in the HHS
regulations, the 1988 DOJ Memorandum emphasized that the list provided by
HHS is to be taken as illustrative and not as complete or exhaustive.

99.

Id (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(1) (1987)).

100.
101.

Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84. App. A, pt. 344).
Id. (citation omitted).

102. Id. (quoting § 84.3(jX2Xii)).
103.

See id at Part II(B)(2).
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The 1988 DOJ Memorandum maintained that the major life activity of
procreation, the process of impregnating, conceiving, bearing and giving birth to
a healthy child, is substantially limited in the case of asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals. This conclusion was based on the significant risk that IV will be
transmitted during pregnancy or at birth so that infected males and females
cannot engage in the process of procreation with the assured expectation of
producing a healthy child. The 1988 DOJ Memorandum concluded, "There is
little doubt that procreation is a major life activity and that the physical ability
to engage in normal procreation-procreation free from the fear of what the
infection will do to one's child-is substantially limited when an individual is
infected with the AIDS virus."' °4
According to the 1998 DOJ Memorandum, a second major life activity,
which may or may not have the purpose of procreation, but is limited by HIV
infection is intimate sexual relations. Because of the danger of infecting a sexual
partner, the HIV infected individual is faced with the need to modify his or her
intimate sexual relations, or to adopt a program of abstinence, in order to avoid
infecting a sexual partner. The 1988 DOJ Memorandum concluded: "The life
activity of engaging in sexual relations is threatened and probably substantially
limited by the contagiousness of the virus."' 5
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum explicitly rejected the argument that HIV
infection does not physically prevent procreation or intimate sexual relations, but
that it is the ethical sense or the personal decision of the asymptomatic HIVinfected person not to engage in the activities that results in any limitations on
sexual relations experienced by such an individual. The memorandum does not
provide any significant analysis of this issue except to anticipate that a court
could find, despite the element of personal decision involved, that FIIV infection
had limited these major life activities.
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum further examined the alternative basis for
determining a person is a handicapped individual because the person is regarded
6
by others as having a limitation of major life activities whether they do or not."1
The memorandum cited the Arline opinions and the legislative history of the
1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act to establish the proposition that this
added text meant an impaired person could be protected even if the impairment
"in fact does not substantially limit that person's functioning."'0 7 According to
the 1988 DOJ Memorandum, "The effect of this interpretation is that the
perceived impairment need not directly result in a limitation of a major life
activity, so long as it has the indirect effect, due to the misperceptions of others,
of limiting a life activity (in Arline, the activity of working)."'0 °
The 1988 DOJ Memorandum examined the "otherwise qualified"

104. Id. at n.13.
105. Id. atn.12.
106. See id. at n.14 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(iii) (1994)).
107.

Id. (citing S. REP. No. 127, at 64 (1974)).

108. Id. at n.14.
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requirement of section 504." ° The memorandum concluded that based on
existing scientific and medical knowledge, in most situations the risk of
transmission of HIV is so slight that there will seldom be any justification for
treating HIV infected individuals differently than others based on fear of
contagion."0 In those individuals with only "subclinical manifestations," the
1988 DOJ Memorandum concludes that it is unlikely that asymptomatic
individuals would not be able to participate in any covered program by reason of
disease-related inability to perform. As the individual's disease progresses and
more significant clinical manifestations occur, individualized evaluation of HIVinfected person's ability to perform becomes more appropriate under the terms
of the Rehabilitation Act. Possible transmission in surgical settings, or concern
with effects of HIV-related dementia in sensitive positions such as air traffic
controllers, were identified as the type of situations where justification might be
established for treating HIV infected individuals differently from unimpaired
individuals."'
C. Case Law Extending Protection Under RehabilitationAct to
HI-Infected Individuals
Many of the federal courts that considered the application of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the state courts construing state laws that were
based on the federal statute in cases involving persons with HIV-infection,
initially proceeded on the assumption that there was a difference in the condition
of those persons with AIDS diagnosis and persons who were HIV infected but
asymptomatic. Nevertheless, every court that considered the application of the
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-infected persons whether asymptomatic or
symptomatic found the individuals protected by the Rehabilitation Act or
involving application of those state laws modeled on the federal statute. " ' While
some of these courts directed attention to the requirements of an "impairment"

109. Id. at Part II(C).
110. See id.
at n.17.
I 1. See id. (referring to Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (1986)).
112. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Doe v. Dalton
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11.
1988); Robertson v. Granite City
Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9,684 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Il. 1988); Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No.
CV 87-2514 PAR(PX), 1988 WL 81776 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988); Martinez v. School Bd., 675
F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Doe v. Belleville Pub. Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Ill.
1987); Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Thomas v.

Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); Shuttleworth v.

Broward County, 649 F.Supp. 35 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment
2nd Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 507
A.2d 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 523 A.2d 655 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1987); District 27
Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
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that "substantially limited a major life activity,"' 3 many courts simply presumed
an HIV-infected person was a "person with handicaps."' "' Much of the focus of
these court opinions was whether the handicapped person was "otherwise
qualified," and in that context, whether the HV-infected person's communicable
disease was a threat to others."' Every reported decision construing the
protection of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 up to the passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act in 1990 found HIV-infection, whether it resulted in an
AIDS diagnosis or was asymptomatic, to meet the criteria for establishing that
HIV-infected individuals were "persons with handicaps." The following
discussion ofjudicial opinions will examine typical cases that take the position
that HIV-infection, whether it resulted in AIDS or whether the infected
individual remained asymptomatic, meets the requirements for establishing a
"person with handicaps."
D. Individualwith AIDS DiagnosisIs Handicapped: Chalk v. United States
DistrictCourtfor the CentralDistrictof California
The first federal court of appeals decision to address the treatment of AIDS
as a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act was Chalk v. United States District
Court decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1988.116 The court found that a teacher
diagnosed with AIDS was handicapped and qualified for employment within the
meaning and coverage of the Rehabilitation Act, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court in Arline. 7 The court of appeals did not find it necessary
to determine the existence of an "impairment" that "substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities"; assuming these elements were
satisfied, the court focused on the "direct threat" issue. The court was persuaded
that medical and scientific evidence established that the virus causing AIDS
could not be transmitted through normal classroom contact.
The petitioner, Chalk, a teacher of hearing-impaired student, was hospitalized
with pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and diagnosed as having AIDS. After eight
weeks, the teacher was released to return to work by his physician. However, the
county department of education, Chalk's employer, placed him on administrative
leave pending the medical opinion of the county health director that Chalk was
fit to return to work. The county health director subsequently informed the
employer that the teacher posed no risk of infecting his students or others with
the virus causing AIDS."' After the close of the school year, the employer
offered the teacher an administrative position, at the same rate of pay and
benefits, with the option of working at the education department's offices or at

113. See, e.g., CentinelaHosp., 1988 WL 81776.
114. See, e.g., Chalk 840 F.2d at 701.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117.

See id. at 871(applying School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273

(1987)).
118.

See id. at 703.
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his home. The employer also advised the teacher that his insistence on returning
to the classroom would be met by an effort to obtain court-ordered declaratory
relief. When Chalk insisted on returning to teaching, the employer filed a state
court action. Chalk responded by filing a federal court suit seeking a preliminary
and permanent injunction barring the employer from excluding him from the
classroom. Instead of pursuing its state court suit, the employer counterclaimed
in a federal court action." 9
The federal district court denied the teacher's motion for a preliminary
injunction. The court then addressed each of the four factors set out in Arline for
determining whether a person was "otherwise qualified" in terms of the risk of
transmission of a contagious disease:
(1) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(2) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(3) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties),
(4) the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm. 2 '
The court found, based on current medical and scientific knowledge, that in
the case of a person infected with the virus that causes AIDS:
(1) the duration of the risk of infection was long,
(2) the severity of the risk was catastrophic,
(3) transmission of the disease appeared unlikely to occur, and
(4) the probability that the disease would cause harm to others in the
workplace setting was minimal.'21
However, the district court remained uncertain about the strength of the medical
understanding ofAIDS, about scientific knowledge of HV transmission because
of the relatively limited time for actual observation of the AIDS epidemic, and
about the risk that the "almost inevitable mutation of the virus" could lead to new
transmission routes." Due to this uncertainty, the court denied the teacher's
motion. Further, the district court concluded that the teacher's injury was
outweighed by the fear likely to be produced by his presence in the classroom.
The employer reassigned the teacher to an administrative position coordinating
grant applications and materials for the hearing impaired program.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court focusing primarily on the
"otherwise qualified" element of the Rehabilitation Act assuming that the
elements needed to establish that the petitioner was "an individual with
handicaps" were met. Because the posture of the case was a denial of a motion
for a preliminary and permanent injunction, the court of appeals framed the issue
as whether the teacher could demonstrate the required probability of success on

119. See id.
120. Id. at 706-07 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 286 (quoting Brief of the American Medical
Association as amicus curiae in Arline at 28)).
121. Id at706.
122. Id. at 707.
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the merits of a permanent injunction. The court of appeals beganwith a review
of the Arline holding by framing the issue in the following terms: "[T]he

question which is of central importance to this case: under what circumstances
may a person handicapped with a contagious disease be 'otherwise qualified'
within the meaning of Section 5 04 ?"'"
The court of appeals recognized the four factors set out in the Arline opinion
to be the determinative considerations that need to be examined in handicap cases
involving contagious diseases. 2' The court noted that the petitioner had
submitted evidence to the district court of over one hundred medical journal
articles and the statements of five AIDS experts, submissions that revealed "[a]n
overwhelming evidentiary consensus of medical and scientific opinion regarding
the nature and transmission of AIDS."' 25 The court observed that all published
studies "have consistently found no apparent risk of HIV infection to individuals
exposed through close, non-sexual contact with AIDS patients. ' ' 26 In support of
its findings, the court cited:
non-sexual
(1) the Surgeon General's report that found no known risk of27
infection by everyday contact or in the school settings,
(2) reports of the Centers for Diseases Control,
(3) a report of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of

Sciences, and
(4) an amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association is

support of the petitioner's position on appeal. 28
The court of appeals concluded that the district court had failed to properly
apply the Arline four part analysis and had improperly placed the burden of proof
on the teacher. The court interpreted Arline as permitting discriminatory
exclusion only where there is a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others. Further, the court of appeals found that the district court
ignored the admonition in Arline to defer to the reasonable medical judgment of
public health officials. The Ninth Circuit held that, rather, the lower court
improperly relied on speculation and rejected the overwhelming consensus of
medical opinion. Finding that Chalk had demonstrated a strong probability of
success on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that it was error to require the
teacher to disprove all theoretical possibilities of harm. 29

The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the teacher's injury outweighed any harm
to the employer. The court noted that there was no evidence of significant risk
to children or others at the school resulting from the teacher's presence and that
123.

Id at 705.
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a decision based on fear would frustrate the goals of the Rehabilitation Act. The
court did recognize that the district court would have to deal with the
apprehension of the school community and the likely progress of the teacher's
disease. As the teacher would be susceptible to opportunistic infections which
themselves would be communicable, the Ninth Circuit instructed the district
court to determine reasonable procedures, including periodic reports from the
teacher's doctors, to assure that no significant risk of harm would arise from the
teacher's classroom presence. 3 °
The court in Chalk apparently assumed that the Arline opinion established
that individuals with an AIDS diagnosis are handicapped and that it is
unnecessary in subsequent litigation for a court to make a case-by-case analysis
to determine that individuals with AIDS are "persons with handicaps." The
analysis undertaken by the court of appeals was limited to a determination of
whether the presumed handicapped individual was "otherwise qualified." In
making this determination, the court applied the factors outlined in Arline and
relied on established medical and scientific evidence to determine whether there
was any danger of transmission of the particular communicable virus that infects
the person with AIDS. The Ninth Circuit accepted the reported consensus in
medical knowledge about AIDS as the benchmark by which special treatment of
persons with AIDS must be evaluated.
E. Asymptomatic HIV-Infection IndividualPerceivedas Handicapped:
Doe v. Centinela Hospital
In Doe v. CentinelaHospital,"' decided in 1988, a California federal district

court found an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual to be properly excluded
from a federally funded hospital's residential drug and alcohol program because
of fear of contagion, and to be handicapped within the terms of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The plaintiff charged the hospital with a violation of section 504 on the
ground that he was a "seropositive" individual, thus an "individual with
handicaps" excluded from a covered program.'
The plaintiff had been
discharged from the hospital's rehabilitation program after he tested positive on
an HIV-antibody test. The court found that a positive test result indicated that
a person was infected with HIV and capable oftransmitting the virus to others.'33
The court acknowledged the requirements of the HHS regulations for
determining whether a person is handicapped; namely if he "(i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities, or (ii) has a record
34 of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment."

130.

See id at 712.

131.

No. CV87-2514 PAR (PX), 1988 WL 81776 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988).

132.

Id. at *l.

133.

See id. at *6 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b)).

134.

Id. at *5(citation omitted).
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In applying this criteria, some confusion arose as a.result of the plaintiff's
effort to identify what "major life activity" was at issue. The plaintiff first
argued that limiting his "access to health care" constituted a limitation of a major
life activity that is limited by his being regarded as handicapped; alternatively he
argued that he was regarded as handicapped and because "his reproductive
system" was35indisputably impaired, he meets the elements set out in the HHS
regulations.
The court viewed the case as one involving the question of whether the
plaintiff is "regarded as having such an impairment."' 36 Specifically, the court
avoided the issue of whether all asymptomatic HIV-infected persons are
handicapped. According to the court, "On the record adduced in this case, it is
necessary only to address the question whether [the hospital] regarded this
plaintiff as having a disabling handicap; it is not necessary to reach the broader
question whether asymptomatic I-ilV carriers are in all cases protected by §
504."'37
The court was able to side-step the question of whether the two major life

activities identified by the plaintiff met the statutory criteria and whether, in fact,
the plaintiff's infection limited the plaintiff's ability to engage in the activities.
Instead, the court found that the discrimination by the hospital based on the
plaintiff's infection did substantially limit his ability to obtain treatment for his
addiction."" It is significant that the court did not identify a life activity that was
directly impacted by HIV infection, but instead the court identified a life activity

limited as a result of discrimination occasioned by the fact the patient was
infected with IHV. 13 9 The approach of the court is clearly revealed in its
language: "There is no dispute that [the hospital] perceived plaintiff to have
precisely the condition [physical impairment] that he actually has and treated him
on that account as limited in his ability to learn how to deal with a dependency
[a major life activity] in the [covered] program. '"" As if to emphasize this view
of the elements to be proven, the court asserted that "'major life activities'
include learning. Therefore, given the fact that impairment is uncontroverted,
and plaintiffs condition was treated by [the hospital] as limiting a major life
activity, the only question is whether that limitation was substantial.""'
The court concluded that the hospital's concern with the potential for
transmission of HIV totally precluded the patient from participating in the drug
treatment program and, therefore, the exclusion substantially limited a major life
activity of the patient despite the fact that there were alternative out-patient
programs available."" The court decided that the only issue to be resolved was
135.

Id.

136.

Id.

137.
138.

Id.
See id. at *7.

139.

See id

140.
141.
142.

d at *6.
Id.
See id. at *7.
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whether the
patient was "otherwise qualified" and remanded the case for trial on
4
that issue.1 1

The opinion in Doe v. Centinelais significant both for what it did and did not
decide. The court avoided determining whether all asymptomatic HIV-infected
persons were "individuals with handicaps." However, the opinion broadened the
basis for establishment of whether a person with an impairment is handicapped
by allowing a showing that discrimination that followed from a perception that
the person is handicapped resulted in interference with a major life activity,
rather than requiring that the impairment directly result in a substantial limitation
of a major life activity.
F. Asymptomatic HIV-Infected Individual Is Per Se Handicapped:
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District
The view that asymptomatic HIV-infected persons are per se handicapped
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was adopted by a federal district court in
California in 1986 in Thomas v. AtascaderoUnified SchoolDistrict.'44 The court
entered a permanent injunction in favor of a HIV-infected kindergarten student
who had been expelled from school after biting another child. The court found
the HIV-infected child handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act and ordered the
defendant4 school district to allow the child to attend regular kindergarten
classes.

The court, relying on the Centers for Diseases Control's expertise,
determined that infection with HIV involved a range of symptoms ranging from
early acute, though transient, manifestations of infection, asymptomatic infection,
persistent swollen lymph-modes and the presence of opportunistic disease and/or
rare type of cancer.
The court concluded that all phases of HIV infection constitute an
impairment and that infection inevitably substantially limits some major life
functions of every infected person.'" The court reasoned as follows:
Individuals in all four of the CDC classifications [of HIV disease] suffer
from impairments to their physical symptoms. Persons infected with the
AIDS virus suffer significant impairments of their major life activities.
People infected with the AIDS virus may have difficulty caring for
themselves, performing manual tasks... learning and walking, among
other life functions. Even those who are asymptomatic have
abnormalities in their hemic and reproductive systems making
reproduction and childbirth dangerous to themselves and others.'4 7
The court concluded that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 07-11.
662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
See id at 381.
See id at 379.

Id
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handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. 4 '
Since the plaintiff was a kindergarten child, the court obviously found no
need to inquire into whether the plaintiff intended to have children, but for
having contracted HIV-infection. The court basically eschewed a case-by-case
analysis with the effect that asymptomatic HIV-infected persons were viewed as
per se "persons with handicaps."' 49
V. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT OF 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 150 is an omnibus
federal anti-discrimination law prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities in employment, 5' government programs and services," 2 public
accommodations and services, 53 and telecommunications." The ADA replaces
the word "handicap" found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 5 with the term
"disability" in order to avoid what some considered unfavorable connotations of
the former usage." 6 In order to come under the protection of the ADA, an
individual must satisfy the definition of disability developed in the statute and as
promulgated in regulations by the Congressionally delegated agencies. For
example, under Title I of the ADA the designated agency is the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").'57
The EEOC issued
regulations along with interpretative guidelines on June 26, 1991.)58 The
legislative history of the ADA reveals that the relevant case law interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 should generally be applied when interpreting not
only the term disability, but also the other language in the ADA." 9 The ADA
specifically provides that it shall not invalidate or limit the remedies and rights
available under any other federal or state laws that provides greater or equal
protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities."
The ADA contains four substantive parts or titles with a fifth title covering
enforcement provisions and exemptions. Title I regulates employment relations
and prohibits employers from discriminating against any qualified individual

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See id. at 381.
See id at 381-82.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
See42U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117.
See id. §§ 12,131-12,134.
See id §§ 12,141-12,165.
Seeid. §§ 12,181-12,189.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b).
Seeid.§ 12,117.

158.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1987); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991).

159.

See H.R.REP.No. 485,at 50(1990), reprintedin 1990U.S.C.C.A.N.303,332-66; H.R.

REP. No.485, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-54; S. REP.No. 116, at 21

(1989).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(b).
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with a disability with regard to hiring, promoting, firing or any term or condition,
or privilege of employment.""' Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in
public services, and also imposes an accommodation requirement on state and
local government providers of services. 62 Title III prohibits discrimination in
places of public accommodation and commercial facilities and requires the
design of new facilities to provide access for the disabled."6 3 Title IV relates to
telecommunication and common carriers,' imposing, for example, requirements
for telephone communications for speech and hearing impaired individuals. 6
The ADA definition of"a person with a disability"'" tracks the definition of
"a person with handicaps" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 67 An individual
has a disability under the ADA if any one of three circumstances is present: (1)
has a physical or mental impairment that subsequently limits one or more of the
major life activities; or (2) is regarded as having such an impairment, or (3) has
a record of such impairment.6S In the context of the ADA, the term "disabled"
does not include individuals solely because the individual is a transvestite,
homosexual or bisexual; additional conditions not included are transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender disorder absent physical
impairment, compulsive gambling, kleptomania. 69 Where use of controlled
substances is the basis of any adverse treatment, the individual is not considered
qualified for protection under the ADA.'
The ADA requires that the EEOC issue regulations to implement the
provisions dealing with employment discrimination under Title I.'71 The
regulations provide clarification of the definition of disability by providing
guidance for applying the specific terms of the statute including: (1) physical or
mental impairment;"r (2) major life activities;" (3) substantially limits; (4)
has a record of such impairment;7 5 and (5) is regarded as having such an
impairment.76
The regulations issued by the EEOC in 1991 provide guidance for applying
the first prong of the definition of"a person with a disability" by stating that the

161.
162.

See id. §§ 12,111-12,117.
See id §§ 12,131-12,165.

163.

See id. §§ 12,181-12,189.

164.

See id. §§ 225, 711.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See 47 U.S.C. § 225.
42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B), (C).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
Seeid. §§ 12,114, 12,208, 12,211.
See id. §§ 12,114, 12,210.
See id§ 12,116.

172.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999).

173.
174.

See id § 1630.2(i).
See id. § 1630.2(j).

175.

See id. § 1630.2(k).

176.

See id § 1630.2(I).
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term "physical impairment" included: (1) any physical disorder, or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine or (2) any mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic-brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific hearing disabilities." The EEOC regulations further
provided that whether a person is impaired is to be determined without mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."' The example
given is that of an epileptic who is to be regarded as having an impairment even
if the symptoms of epilepsy can be controlled by drugs. 79 Similarly, a person
with a hearing or vision loss is to be regarded as impaired even if the condition
can be corrected with a hearing aid or glasses."
According to the EEOC regulations, major life activities include: "Caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, or working."'' The regulations specifically indicate that the provided
list is not to be regarded as exhaustive noting that other major life activities
"include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting and reaching."'8 2 The
EEOC Interpretative Guidelines include within the terms of major life activities
"those basic activities that the average person in the general population can
perform with little or no difficulty."'8
The EEOC set out factors to be considered in determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major activity including: "(i) the nature
and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact, resulting from the impairment."'' The term
"substantially limits" is given the meaning: "(i) unable to perform a major life
activity that the average person of the general population can perform; or (ii)
significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which...
the average person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity."" 5 The EEOC guidelines indicate that for a disability to exist an
impairment must substantially limit one or more of an individual's major life

177. See id. § 1630.2(h).
178. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h). But see the recent Supreme Court cases holding that
mitigating measures are taken into account in determining disability, Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v.United ParcelService, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999);
Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

179.

See id.

180. See id.
181.
182.
183.
184.

185.

Id § 1630.2(i).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
Id § 1630.2(jX2).
Id.
§ 1630.20X1).
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activities.'"
Under the second prong of the ADA's definition of disabled, an individual

with a record of such impairment "is someone who (1) had a physiological or
mental disorder but no longer has that impairment" (e.g., an individual who in the
past was misclassified as having a learning disorder.)"" The EEOC
interpretation of this prong of the disability definition requires that the record of
impairment must show that it would substantially limit one or more of the
individual's major life activities. 8'

Further, the individual's record of

impairment must be of a condition that would be covered under the ADA if it
were a current condition." 9 The EEOC's interpretation of the ADA takes the
view that the mere fact an individual has a record of being a "disabled veteran,"
or is on "disability retirement," or is classified as disabled for other purposes
does not mean that the individual necessarily satisfies the ADA definition of
disability. 19°
Under the third prong of the ADA's definition of disability, an individual
who "is regarded as having such an impairment"'' can fit into one of three
different categories according to the EEOC regulations." 9 The first category
includes individuals with a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit a major life activity, but whose impairment is treated as
though it does." The EEOC offers the example of an individual with controlled
high blood pressure that is not, in fact, substantially limiting, but who is
reassigned to less strenuous work because of the employer's unsubstantiated
fears.' The second category includes individuals with a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity only as a result of the
prejudice of others toward the impairment. 95 An example of one such
impairment is physical disfigurement." Finally, individuals may fit into the
third category which includes persons who do not have a physical or mental
impairment but who are treated as though they do."s ' This category includes the
male homosexual who is assumed to be HIV infected merely by virtue of his
sexual orientation.' 98

Neither AIDS nor the HIV infection is directly identified within the statutory
language of the ADA. Of course, this is to be expected because the ADA does
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. § 1630.2(i).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k); 56 Fed. Reg, 35,742.
See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i)-(j); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,741.
See 29 C..R. app. § 1630.2(i)-(j); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,741.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,742.
42 U.S.C. § 12,202(2)(c) (1994).
See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,742.
See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C)).
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not make mention of any specific disease; but instead, defines the concept of
disability with reference to impairment and substantial limitation on major life
functions. However, the legislative history is clear that it was the intention of
members of the House and Senate that these medical conditions be treated as
disabilities.
The first legislation introduced to provide protection from discrimination of
individuals having AIDS or HIV infection was the AIDS Federal Policy Act of
1987'" that would have amended the Public Health Services Act. This
legislation would have provided non-discrimination protection in employment,
housing, and public services to those persons who were infected, or who were
regarded as infected, with the causal agent for Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome.' ° This legislation made no distinction between symptomatic and
asymptomatic infection. Both the Senate and House's versions of their
legislation addressed the issue of "otherwise qualified" by providing that an
individual would not otherwise by qualified if under established medical criteria,
under the circumstances involved, an infected individual would expose other
individuals to a significant possibility of being infected.2° ' Hearings were held
in 1988 on this legislation in both the House2' and Senate, 3 but no further
action was taken.
Legislation was introduced in 1988 in the form of an initial Americans with
Disabilities Act, abandoning the approach of an HIV-specific statute and
introducing a more generalized approach to antidiscrimination protection for
persons with disabilities without identifying specifically individual diseases or
disorders covered such as AIDS or HIV infection.' 4 Joint hearings were held,
but the legislation did not proceed for further action.205
In 1989, when the 101 st Congress convened, the Americans with Disabilities

199.

S. 1575, H.R. 3071, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987), 133 CONG. REc. 21,903 (1987).

200. See S. 1575, H.R. 3071 § 2341.
201. S. 1575, H.R. 3071 § 2341(b)(1).
202. See Bills andResolution to Improve AIDS Counselingand Education andto Encourage
Better Testingand Reportingto Help Protect the General PublicAgainstAIDS Infection: Hearings
on HR. 338, HR. 339, H.R. 344, H.R 345, HR. 2272, HR. 2273, H.R. 3071, and H.R. Con. Res.
8 Before Subcomm. on Health and the Env 't of the House Comm. on Energy andCommerce, I 00th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).
203. See To Amend the PublicHealth Services Act to Establisha Grant Programto Provide
for Counseling and Testing Services Related to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and to
Establish Certainprohibitionsfor the Purpose of ProtectingIndividualswith Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome and to Establish Certain Prohibitionsfor the Purpose of Protecting
Individuals with AcquiredImmune Deficiency Syndrome or Related Conditions: Hearingson S.
1575 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).
204. See S. 2345, H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
205. See JointHearingof the Subcomm. on the Handicappedofthe Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
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Act was introduced."1 The Senate version of the ADA was referred to the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources whose report clearly includes the
conclusion that HIV infection, both symptomatic and asymptomatic, is to be
treated as a disability under the ADA.2"' The House version of the ADA was
referred to four committees, two of which (the Committee on Labor and
Education' 8 and the Committee on the Judiciary ° ) specifically concluded that
HIV infection, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, qualified as a disability
under the ADA. While all of the Congressional legislative reports on the ADA
that considered the question of whether HIV infection is a disability under the
ADA reached the same conclusion that it is, however, none of the reports
actually proceeded through a step-by-step analysis under the actual terms of the
statute to show how AIDS and HIV-infection met the statutory criteria for
disability. Instead, these reports simply assume that the impairment caused by
HIV is a significant physical impairment and that persons with HIV infection are
assumed to have a disability. Nevertheless, both the House and Senate reports
make it clear that in enacting the ADA, both houses of Congress concurred in the
view that "discrimination against individuals with HIV infection is widespread
and has serious repercussions for both the individual who experiences it and that
Nation's efforts to control the epidemic."2 ' In response to this assessment, the
reports of the Senate and the House make it equally clear that it was the intent of
the sponsors of the ADA that the AIDS and HIV-infection be recognized as
disabilities under the terms of the ADA. 21 ' For example, the House Report
specifically endorsed the view that "a person infected with human
immunodeficiency virus is covered under the first prong of thedefinition of the
term disability because of a substantial limitation to procreation and intimate
sexual relations. '21 2
The various Congressional committees were much less focused on whether
AIDS and HIV-infection constitute a disability than they were with whether HIV,
as an infectious disease, should be treated differently than other disabilities. One
of the most hotly debated issues concerned coverage of HIV-infected persons
employed in food handling jobs. A proposed amendment to section 103 of the
House Bill by Representative Chapman would have permitted an employer to
refuse to assign, or to reassign, an employee with an infectious or communicable

206. See S.Res. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. Res. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
207. See Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Americans with Disabilities Act of
1989, S.REP. No. 116, at 8 (1989).
208. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333.
209. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451.
210. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 31 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8 (citing statement of the
Chairman of the President's Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic,
Admiral James Watson).
211. SeeS. REP.No. 101-116, at 22(1990), H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 52 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333.
:212. H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 305, 333.
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disease to a job involving food handling, provided the employer provided the
worker alternative employment." 3 Congressman Chapman conceded that the
Centers for Disease Control had reported that there was no evidence of any case
of HIV being transmitted in the process of handling food, but the Congressman
maintained that the fact there were reported cases of HIV infection when the
cause of infection was unknown provided sufficient justification for the right to
discriminate against HIV-infected food handlers. 24 In order to reach a
compromise between the Senate version of the ADA and the House version with
the Chapman amendment, an amendment by Senator Hatch was adopted that
required the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not later than six months
after passage of the ADA, to determine if there were any infections or
communicable diseases that might be transmitted through food handling.215 Such
a list, if provided, would serve as a basis for an exception to the prohibition of
employment discrimination against disabled persons. t6 The Secretary of Health
and Human Services and the United States Public Health Service were already
on record with the view that HIV is not transmitted through food preparation
services, and no exception was made for food handlers with AIDS or HIV
infection.2t
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing the employment non-discriminations
disability provisions of Title I of the ADA. 28 The Department of Justice (DOJ)
is responsible for promulgating regulations and guidelines for enforcement of
nondiscrimination against the disabled in public services under provisions of
Title II of the ADA, 29 and in public accommodations under provisions of Title
III of the ADA. "' The DOJ regulations follow those of the EEOC in adopting
the definition of the term "physical or mental impairment" in the regulations
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."' However, the
DOJ regulations go further by adopting an additional support of the definition of
"physical or mental impairment" that lists specific conditions and diseases. The
DOJ regulations provide:
The phase physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to,
such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as

213. See 136 CONG. REC. 10,911 (1990).
214. Seeid at 10,911-12.
215. See 136 CONG. REC. S9555-6 (daily ed. July I, 1990).
216. See id.
217. See Letter to Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 136 CONG.
REC. S9545 (daily ed. July II, 1990); CDC, Summary: Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Il/Lymphodenopathy
Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MMWR 681, 693-94 (1985), in 136 CONG. REC. 59546
(daily ed. July 11, 1990).

218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (1994).
219.

See id § 12,134(a).

220. See id § 12,186(b).
221.

34 C.F.R. § 104 (1999).
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orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairment, cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease,
diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning
disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic),
tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.222
The DOJ regulations clearly state that HIV infection constitutes an impairment:
"HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic constitutes a physical
impairment."' "
VI. PRE-BRAGDON V. ABBOTTCASE LAW FINDING PERSONS WITH AIDS AND.
HIV-INFECTION PROTECTED UNDER ADA
A. AIDS Diagnosisand HIV-Infection Treated as a PresumedDisability
Many of the federal courts considering discrimination claims based on AIDS
or HIV-infection brought under the ADA have not undertaken an extensive
analysis to determine whether either, or both, conditions qualify as disabilities
under the statute. In some cases, the court has merely adopted the proposition
that these conditions constitute a disability without further analysis. For
example, in Howe v. Hull,"' a patient's estate sued a hospital and admitting
physician for refusal to admit a patient with HIV infection in a federal district
court in Ohio. Although hospital physicians differed on whether the patient had
progressed to full-blown AIDS or was merely HIV-positive, the federal district
court found no need to reach a conclusion on this matter. Without further
analysis, the court concluded: "A disability is defined [in the ADA] as 'physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits the person in one or more major
life activities.' AIDS and HIV infection are both disabilities within the meaning
of the ADA."225
Some courts have concluded that AIDS and HIV infection constitute
disabilities by reference to other courts' opinions construing the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.226 These courts have simply cited regulations issued by the relevant
agency designated by the ADA which provide guidance for applying the statutory
terms such as "disability." 22

222. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
223. Id.
224. 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
225. Id. at 78 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840F. Supp. 110, 111 (D.
Utah 1993); 28 C.F.R. § 36,104(i)(b)(ii)).
226. See, e.g., Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Mich.
1994).
227. D.B. v. Bloom, D.D.S., 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 n.4 (D.N.J. 1995).
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B. AIDS DiagnosisandHIV Infection Treatedas a PerSe Disability
In Anderson v. Gus Maker Boston Store,22 a federal district court in Texas
found AIDS and asymptomatic HIV-infection to be per se disabilities under the
ADA. The court began its analysis by citing, as the standard for determination
of the existence of a disability, the three-pronged definition of disability in the
ADA. 9 The court next noted that the ADA defines disability in substantially the
same terms that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines handicaps." Moreover,
the ADA was enacted, according to the court, with the expectation that the
Rehabilitation Act, and the case law construing it, would be used in interpreting
the ADA."'
The court in Anderson recognized that a disability under the ADA

necessarily involves an impairment that has the impact of substantially limiting
one or more major activities of the individual. But significantly, the court found
that the EEOC regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA are to be given
significant deference when determining the meaning of the ADA. 23 2 The court
observed that although the list of major life activities in the EEOC regulations is
not exhaustive, the list does include such functions as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning
and working."" Without citation the court concluded that "impairments on the
procreative process also substantially limit a major life activity." 4
The Anderson court then recognized a second basis of authority for its
conclusion that AIDS and asymptomatic-HIV infection are per se disabilities
under the ADA. The court was very direct in its view that a case-by-case
analysis is not required because a body of case law has determined that both
AIDS and HIV infection constitute disabilities due to the substantial limitations
these conditions place on a person with AIDS or HIV infection in their ability to
procreate or engage in sexual relationships. 2" The Anderson court declared:
"Conditions such as AIDS, HIV, blindness and deafness, inter alia, have been
determined by the courts to be per se disabilities. In other words, it has been
established both that these conditions impact. a major life activity and that this
impact is substantially impairing of a given activity." ' The courts reading of
both the EEOC regulations and the case law provides its authority for the

228.
229.
230.

924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
See id at 773 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)).
See id. (citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilders, 53 F.3d 723, 725 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995);

Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993).

231.

See id. (citing Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1995); Bolton v.

Scrivner, Inc. 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. Part 1630-Interpretation

Guidelines to Title I of the ADA, § 1630.2(g) (1995)).
232. See id. at 773-74 n.19.
233.

Id.at 773 (citing Dutcher,53 F.3d at 726).

234. Id. at 774 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
235.

See id.

236. Id. at 774-75 (citations omitted).
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conclusion that AIDS and HIV infection are per se disabilities.
The Anderson court, however, provided an alternative basis for finding
disabilities when applying the three-pronged definition of disability provided in
the ADA. 237 The court goes on to concluded that when a condition has not been
recognized as a per se disability, the court should treat the question of whether
a given condition is a disability as a mixed question of law and fact. 3 The court
went on to conclude that if HIV is not a per se disability (as the court believes it
to be), then the court finds that Anderson's HIV-status in this case was a
' To support its conclusion, the court cited the
disability as a matter of law. 39
relevant EEOC regulations and noted that restrictions on procreation and travel
are experienced by persons with HIV-infection. 2 ° The court notes in a footnote:
"Beyond the obvious impairment on the ability to procreate, even an
asymptomatic HIV-positive individual cannot travel freely. Such an individual
must be always mindful of exposure to bacterial infection and fungi or even
places requiring vaccinations.""24
C. AIDS Diagnosis andHIV-Infection Treated as a Disability
Because of PhysicalImpairment
Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graph,P.C., 24 2 decided by a federal district court in
Pennsylvania, involved an HIV-infected attorney claiming that his discharge by
a law firm violated the ADA. A significant issue in the case was whether IIVinfection constituted a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The court
characterized the law firm's defense in these terms: "The thrust of the defense
argument is that even though HIV-positive status, most assuredly, is not a happy
medical condition with which to be diagnosed, it is not in fact disabling."2 43
Basically, the defense maintained that HIV infection was not an impairment and
that the HIV infection did not interfere with any major life function of the
plaintiff; most importantly, it did not prevent him from engaging in legal work. 2 "
The federal district court began its analysis by citing the three-pronged
definition of disability in the ADA.145 However, the court quickly noted that the
plain language of the statute does not provide any significant guidance for
246
determining whether HIV-infection is within the meaning of disability.
Moreover, the trial court judge eschewed any notion that the everyday
understanding of disability was controlling. The court noted

237.

See id.

238.

See id. at 775 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994)).

239.
240.

See id. at 776.
See id. at 777.

241.

Id. at 777 n.37.

242,

862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

243.

Id at 1318.

244.
245.

See id
See id. at 1318-19.

246.

See id at 1319 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994)).
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[tihat lay observation may have a certain common sense ring to it, but
my role is not limited to construe the statute so that it might conform
with a lay perception. Rather, I must read with care the definition of
disability that Congress and the EEOC, gave us, and decide whether this
plaintiff's disease and its symptoms fall within one or more of those
express statutory and regulatory definitions, as anomalous as the

statutory result might seem to some.247

Drawing upon the first prong of the ADA and the relevant EEOC regulations, the
court concluded that the HIV-infected attorney was disabled. 4 "
The court found that the HIV infection resulted in an impairment to the
extent that it produced certain psychological disorders including fever, rash, and
skin disorders.249 Further, the court found the existence of impairment from the
fact that HIV creates a physiological disorder of the hemic (blood) and lymphatic
symptoms, citing a usual development of swollen lymph nodes created by HIV

infection.2o
In considering the issue of limitations on major life activities, the court
considered the relevant EEOC regulations." However, the court found no basis
in the regulations for the claim that the relevant life activity under the statute
were limited to work-life or work-activities.2" 2 While the plaintiff argued that
HIV infection limited his ability to procreate, the court did not base its
conclusion that the plaintiff was disabled on that basis. According to the court:
The factual record in this case is thin, indeed, as to whether HIV status
is a disorder or condition that affects the "reproduction" system. No
physicians testified as to that, and the parties seemed content to rely on
administrative findings and the ruling of otherjudges ...
[such as] a case
involving a plaintiff with full-blown AIDS... found in dictum that a
person who is HIV-infected is substantially limited in a major life
activity because of the significant risk of transmitting the HIV infection
to a partner or a child, thereby endangering their lives. 2"
The court, nonetheless, specifically stated that, "[i]t is clear, therefore, that
the language of the statute does not preclude procreating as a major life activity,
but many will include it."" 4 Thus, the court suggested procreation could
constitute a major life activity, but such a showing was not necessary to establish

247.

Id

248.

See id at 1319-20.

249.
250.

See id.
at 1320 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1993)).
See id. (citing depositions of physicians who had treated the plaintiff).

251.

See id. (citing Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Doe v.

Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist., No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ii. 1988) (describing in detail the

effects of HIV infection on the body))).
252.
253.
254.

See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
Id.
Id.
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that HIV-infection resulted in disability. 2" The court based its finding of
disability on the physiological effects of HIV infection. The court concluded that
the effect of the plaintiff's infection resulted in physical impairment that
substantially limited one or more of the plaintiff's major life functions, and,
therefore, he had a disability within the meaning of the ADA.2S6 The court in
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf,P.C., based its conclusion on a two factor analysis:
(1) HIV infection constituted an impairment, and (2) this impairment produced
physical symptoms, or interference with physiological functions, in the form of
fever, rash, weight loss, skin disorders, and swollen lymph nodes." 7 The court went on to determine that the plaintiff did not satisfy the second
prong of the definition of disability in the ADA, determining that the plaintiff
neither had a record of such impairment, nor was he likely to establish that he
was discriminated against because others regarded him as having such an
impairment."8 The court found the plaintiff did not have a record of such
impairment because he was discharged only a few months after he tested HIVpositive. The court reasoned that this period of time was not long enough to
constitute a history of impairment." The court also suggested that the plaintiff
was not likely to establish that members of the law firm perceived him to be
impaired because there was a litany of legitimate reasons why plaintiff was
fired.2'
D. HIV-Infection Treatedas DisabilityBecause of Infectiousness
Gates v. Rowland,26 decided in 1994 by the Ninth Circuit involved claims
of discrimination within a correctional facility. The opinion of the court is
significant for two reasons. First, the court did not draw a distinction between
AIDS and HIV-infection, and second, because it found a disability to exist
because of the "infectiousness" of HIV. The case was brought under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,262 but the court significantly cited the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Department of Justice Regulations promulgated under
authority of that statute.263
The court's analysis began with consideration of the Supreme Court's
opinion in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline." The court noted that
according to the Arline opinion, the contagious effects of a disease cannot be

255.
256.

See idat 1321.
See id. at 1320.

257.

See id. at 1321.

258. See id.
259. See id. at 1322 (applying 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2(1), (k) (1993)).
260. See id.
261. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
262. See id at 1445 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994)).
263. See id. at 1446 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35,104(4X)(IXii)).
264. 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
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distinguished from the physical effects of a disease.265 The court then cited its
own opinion in Chalk v. United States DistrictCourt for the proposition that in

determining the existence of handicap or disability, "the physical impairment to
the individual is not the issue, but rather the issue is the contagious effect of the
HIV virus." 2' With regard to infectiousness, the court concluded that there is no
distinction to be made between persons with an AIDS diagnosis and those who
are asymptomatic. The court noted that the ADA defines disability in virtually
identical terms to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.267 The court further observed
that the DOJ regulations implementing the ADA include in their catalogue of
physical or medical impairments "HIV disease whether symptomatic or
'
asymptomatic."268
On this basis, the court stated: "[W]e hold that a person
infected with the HIV virus is an individual with a disability within the meaning
of the Act. 269
VII. CASE LAW FINDING PERSONS WITH HI V-INFECTION NOT
PROTECTED UNDER THE ADA

A. A ParticularizedDeterminationThat Asymptomatic HIV Infection
Is Not a Disability
Ennis v. NationalAss 'n of Business andEducationalRadio Inc., decided by

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1995, involved an
employee who claimed she was fired because her employer wanted to avoid
paying for medical insurance for her adopted son who was HIV-infected but
asymptomatic. 27 The basis of this action was not a claim of prohibited
discrimination of a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA.
Instead, the suit was brought under a section of the ADA that prohibits employers
from making adverse employment decisions against an employee "because of the
known disability of a person with whom the qualified individual is known to
have an association. 27'
The court in Ennis undertook an analysis of whether the HIV-infected child
met any of the three prongs of the definition of disability set out in the ADA

265. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 273).
266. Id. (construing Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)).
267. See id. (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(2) (1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994)).
268. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4)(I)(ii) (1993)).
269. Id. See also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1524 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Whether or not asymptomatic HIV infection alone is defined as an actual "physical
impairment," it is clear that this correctional system treatsthe inmates such that they are
unable or perceived as unable, to engage in "major life activities" relative to the rest of
the prison population . . . we believe that it is appropriate in this case to find

seropositivity a "handicap" with the meaning of the Act.
Id.
270.
271.

Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 57 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(4)).
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definition.2" The court expressed skepticism about the authority of the EEOC
regulations defining "impairment,"273 rejected the notion that the ADA permitted
recognition of any per se disability," 4 and stressed the need for a case specific
finding of both an impairment and an actual limitation of a major life activity of
the individual. 2 "
According to the Ennis court, "the plain language of the [ADA's disability]
provision requires that a finding of disability be made on an individual basis."276
The court reasoned that the terms of the definition of disability anticipated a
particularized determination. " Specifically, the court cited the terms of the
statutory definition of disability that requires a finding of impairment "with
respect to [the] individual," and the court stressed the requirement that the
finding of an impairment must involve the determination that the impairment,
"substantially limit[s] a major life activity of the individual.""27 Further, the
court cited a number of federal court opinions including one of its own opinions,
construing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that concluded "the question of who
is a handicapped
person under the Act is best suited to a 'case-by-case
2 79
determination. ,,
The court went on to consider the factual evidence before it and concluded
that there was no evidence in the record to support the view that the child in
question was "impaired, to any degree, or that he currently endures any
limitation, . . . on any major life activity."'
The court did not explore the
medical understanding of asymptomatic HIV infection, but simply assumed that
a finding of disability required a finding of visible physical manifestations of the
effects of HIV infection. The court found no such observable physical
manifestations citing the mother's admission that "her son suffers no ailments or
conditions that affect the manner in which he lives on a daily basis."' s
The court in Ennis adopted the View that the only way asymptomatic HIVinfection could be found to be a disability would be to regard all HIV-infected
persons as disabled. According to the court, in order to find the child "disabled
under the ADA, therefore, we would have to conclude that HIV-positive status
272. See id. at 59 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)).
273. Id.at 60-61 n.4 (discussing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(hXl) (1994) and concluding that
"[a]lthough uncertain of the EEOC's authority to promulgate this regulation ...we do not
understand this regulation to be in conflict with the above conclusion.").
274. See id.
275. See id. at 59-60.
276. Id. at 59.
277. See id.
278. Id

279. Id.at 60 (quoting Forrissi v.Bowen, 794 F.2d 931,933 (4th Cir. 1986); citing Chandler
v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1993); Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1417
(10th Cir. 1992); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 564-64 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914-18 (4th Cir. 1992)).
280. Id
281. Id.
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is per se a disability.""'2 Instead, the Ennis court took the view that
[t]he plain language of the statute, which contemplates case-by-case
determinations of whether a given impairment substantially limits a
major activity, whether an individual has record of such a substantially
limiting impairment, or whether an individual is being perceived as
having such a substantially. limiting impairment, simply would not
permit this a [sic] conclusion.283
Ultimately the court concluded that the facts as presented did not support the
view that Ennis was discriminated against on the basis of her child's HIVinfection.2 '
B. Asymptomatic HIV Is "PerSe" Not a Disability Under ADA:
Runnebaum v. NationsBankof Maryland
The Runnebaum opinions delivered by the Fourth Circuit represent the most
restrictive view ofthe application ofthe disability provisions ofthe ADA to HIVinfected persons or, more particularly, to asymptomatic HIV-infected persons.8 "
The final plurality en banc opinion rendered in the series of Runnebaum opinions
can be characterized as amounting to a view that asymptomatic HIV-infection is
per se not a disability under the terms of ADA."' Although the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott 8 effectively negates the
significance of much of the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Runnebaum
II, the possibility after the Abbott opinion remaining of individualized
determination of disability under the ADA suggests the value of a close
examination of the Runnebaum opinions. Part of the value of the Runnebaum
opinion is the opportunity it affords to observe the approach to statutory analysis
taken by the en banc plurality opinion in which limited its analysis to the facial
language of the statute eschewing the legislative history and agency regulations
that have played an important role in the opinions of other courts, including the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott. 8
William Runnebaum, diagnosed as having asymptomatic HIV-infection,
claimed discrimination was the basis of the termination of his employment by

282.

Id.

283.

Id

284. See id.
at 62.
285. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 95 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 123 F.3d 156
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("Runnebaum II").
286. See Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 176 (Michael, J.,
dissenting). The dissent observes: "I

believe the majority means to create aper se rule excluding those with asymptomatic HIV from the
protections of the ADA." However, the majority's responds "[the dissent would, perhaps, have
us hold that asymptomatic HIV infection is per se not a disability under the statute. As we discuss
below, however, we decline to do so." Id at 167.
287. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
288. Compare Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 169 n.7, with Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624.
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NationsBank of Maryland in violation of the ADA'" and the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2' ° To prevail on an ERISA claim, it
was necessary for Runnebaum to establish the elements required by the ADA.29
The federal district court, without issuing an opinion, granted the Bank's motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Runnebaum failed to establish a prima
facie case under the ADA.' m A divided, three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of summaryjudgment, holding that Runnebaum
had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability and had
raised issues of material fact as to whether he was fired because he was regarded
as having a disability.293
The opinion rendered by the three-judge panel ("Runnebaum 1") began its
analysis by referring to the elements of discriminatory discharge set forth in the
ADA, including the requirement that a plaintiffestablish that he comes within the
class of qualified persons for protection due to his disability.' Further, the court
discussed the three prong definition of disability under the ADA295 and the
relevant EEOC regulations.2 ' In addition, the court cited to judicial authority"
and relevant regulations of various federal agencies"'8 for the proposition that
asymptomatic HIV-infection is a disability per se. Nevertheless, the court found
the Fourth Circuit opinion in Ennis v. National Ass'n of Business and

EducationalRadio binding and required an individualized inquiry for a finding
of disability under any of the three prongs of the ADA test.2"
The majority of the three-judge panel concluded that Runnebaum presented
289.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).

290. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
291.

See Runnebaum 11, 123 F.3d at 175 (citing Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,

933 F.2d 231, 239 (4th Cir. 1991)).
292. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 95 F.3d 1285, 1287(4th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 123
F.3d at 156.
293.

See id. at 1296.

294. See id. at 1289 (citing Title-[ of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12,112 (1994)).
295. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)).

296. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(a)(2) (1994)).
297. See id at 1289-90 (citing Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Abbott
v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D. Me. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), and revd
in part, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120,
132 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671,679 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Benjamin R v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 818 (W. Va. 1990)).
298. See id. at 1289 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 34.2 (Department of Labor); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104

(Department of Justice); 24 C.F.R. ch. 1, Subch. A., app. I (Department of Housing and Urban
Development); 7 C.F.R. § l5e.103 (Department of Agriculture); 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103 (Federal

Retirement Thrift Investment Board); 22 C.F.R. § 1701.103 (Institute of Peace); 45 C.F.R. §
2301.103 (Arctic Research Commission)).

299. See id. at 1290 (citing Ennis v.National Ass'n of Bus. &Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d. 55, 5960 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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enough circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie showing that he was
terminated because he was regarded as having a disability" and that he was
performing his job at an adequate level."' The court did not find it necessary to
make specific findings regarding the effects of HIV-infection in relation to the
terms "impairment" and "major life activity." Rather, the court found the
evidence established that: (1) bank employees knew Runnebaum was HIVpositive [Runnebaum had reported his sero-positivity to a bank supervisor]; (2)
bank employees knew Runnebaum was taking AZT to treat his condition because
packages of his medication had been delivered to the bank and opened by bank
employees; and (3) the bank supervisor to whom Runnebaum had disclosed his
HIV infection reported that he felt "panicky" and "uncontrolled" and believed
death might be imminent for Runnebaum upon being informed of his
condition. 2 The court concluded that this was enough to meet the evidentiary
requirements that the bank perceived Runnebaum as having an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity. 3 The court dismissed the argument
that Runnebaum's claim was undermined by the fact that he checked a box on an
employment form indicating that he was not handicapped at the time he applied
for the job in the Bank's trust department. 304 Instead, the court stressed that "the
attitudes of others determine whether a person has a disability within the
meaning" of the ADA." 5
The court extensively discussed the reported reaction of the bank supervisor
to Runnebaum's disclosure of his status as HIV-positive.3° The court noted that
while there is a distinction between disabilities apparent to a casual observer
("[a]n employer can see a wheelchair, a guide dog, or a hearing aid") and those
that are not visible to the naked eye, both types of disabilities are covered by the
ADA.30 7 Moreover, the court noted, "[w]hen a disability is not readily apparent,
an employer's reaction upon learning ofthe disability can be relevant to a finding
of discrimination. Specifically, an employer's immediate reaction offers an
insight into his later firing a disabled employee. 308 The reaction of the
supervisory bank employee, coupled with the fact that this employee reported his
knowledge of Runnebaum's IV infection to the individual who was ultimately
responsible for terminating Runnebaum, satisfied the court that Runnebaum had
presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See id.
See id at 1291.
Id. at 1296.
See id at 1291.
See id. at 1290 n.2.

306.

Id.
See id.
at 1290.

307.

Id.at 1295.

308. Id. at 1295 n.8 (citing Lempres v.CBS Inc., 916 F.Supp. 15, 23 n.37 (D.D.C. 1996)
(Pregnancy Discrimination Act plaintiffimust meet requirements similar to those of ADA plaintiffs.
Pregnancy is not observable at first, yet an employer's reaction upon learning an employee is
pregnant may provide basis for finding discriminatory discharge.)).
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whether he was fired because he was regarded as having HIV disease. 3"
However, the dissenting opinion in Runnebaum I concluded that even if
Runnebaum had established that he was an individual with a disability and had
met the requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the
Bank had presented sufficient evidence to establish a legitimate, non-pretextual,
non-discriminatory reason for his discharge."' Specifically, the dissent
maintained Runnebaum failed to establish that he was meeting the Bank's
legitimate expectations at the time of his discharge.3"'
Also, it is significant that the dissent did not find that Runnebaum met the
three-prong definition of disability in the ADA.3" The dissent agreed with the
majority that Runnebaum was required to establish the presence of an
"impairment" affecting a "major life activity." However, the dissent maintained
that the majority had provided no significant analysis of the facts in the case to
support the conclusion that the terms of the statute were satisfied.3"3 In a
footnote, the dissent briefly addressed whether Runnebaum was disabled because
he suffered an actual physical or mental impairment as a result of being HIV
positive." 4 Because Runnebaum was asymptomatic for approximately four years
prior to his termination, the dissent maintained he had neither suffered affliction
from his HIV infection, nor experienced any significant side effects from the
prescribed AZT medication.3"5 The dissent concluded, without citation to the
record, that: "Runnebaum has consistently maintained that he endures no
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, thereby proving that he
is not disabled under the first prong of the ADA's definition of a disability. 3"6
The dissent then addressed the question of whether Runnebaum was "regarded
as" disabled because of his asymptomatic HIV-infection.3 7 The dissent
maintained that Runnebaum's disclosure of his HIV-infection to a fellow bank
employer was done in a social context in the form of a discussion between
friends.3" 8 The reported feelings of "panic" were viewed by the dissent as the
natural reaction of an associate of being "disheartened on learning that his friend
was HIV-positive."' 9 Moreover, the dissent concluded that the fellow employee
"was solicitous of Runnebaum's health and sympathetic to Runnebaum's needs,
320
with the fellow employee styling himself as Runnebaum's 'protector.'
Finally, the dissent observed that no showing was made to link knowledge of
309.
310.
311.
312.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

313.

See id.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See id. at 1303 n.5.
See id (citing the trial record).
Id.
Id.at 1302.
See id at 1302-03.
Id.

320.

Id. at 1303.

1297.
1305 (Williams, J., dissenting).
1303.
1302 (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994) does not apply).
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Runnebaum's HIV status to the decision to discharge him; therefore, the dissent
concluded that "Runnebaum failed to show that he was regarded as having a
disability. 32'
The Fourth Circuit vacated the opinion issued in the three-judge panel in
Runnebaum land granted an en banc rehearing. 32 The issues before the en banc
court were somewhat altered as the result of an amicus brief to the Fourth Circuit
filed by the legal department of Whitman-Walker Clinic ("WWC"), a community
health center in Washington, D.C. specializing in services related to AIDS and
HIV-infection, along with a brief filed by the EEOC. WWC's brief argued that
a person with HIV-infection has an "impairment" under the terms of the ADA
"because from the outset it [HIV] infects the blood and lymphatic system and
progressively destroys the immune system." 3" Similarly, the WWC brief
maintained that all persons with HIV infection, whether symptomatic or
asymptomatic, meet the definition of "disability" in the ADA because their viral
infection substantially limits major life activities including parenting and
pageantry, intimate personal relations, the ability to plan for the future, certain
career options, access to health, life and disability insurance, and the ability to
travel."
The WWC brief provided an account of HIV infection and AIDS that
portrays the disease progressing through various phases, rather than as a series
of independent disease conditions.3e HIV infection is said to mark the start of
disease progression which, within a month, is likely to be manifested in a shortterm mononucleosis-like condition. 3" Although antibodies can be detected in the
blood within six months of infection, a person may not manifest any significant
observable physical symptoms, the so-called "asymptomatic phase."327 However,
the WWC brief pointed out that during this so-called asymptomatic phase, HIV
is active in the hemic (blood) and lymphatic system and compromising the
immune system ("progression of HIV disease is associated with characteristic
immunopathic changes in lymphoid tissue"). 32 Medical treatment following a
determination of HIV infection may include, among other interventions, dietary
plans and medication including protease inhibitors to slow viral reproduction.329
321. Id.
322. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
323. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services at 3, Runnebaum v.
NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (No. 94-2200) (supporting
plaintiff/appellant on the issue of disability).
324. Id. at 4.
325. See id. at 5.
326. See id. (citing JOHN G. BARTLETT, MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF HIV INFECTION 2-3

(1995)).
327. Id. (citing BARTLETT, supranote 326, at 3-4).
328. Id. at 6 (citing Oren J. Cohen et al., Pathogenic Insights from Studies of Lymphoid
Tissuefrom HIV-Infectedlndividuals, 10 J.ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES&HUMAN
RETROViROLOGY 56, 56-512 (Supp. 11995)).
329. See id. at 7 (citing RONALD A. BAKER ET AL., EARLY CARE FOR HIV DISEASE 22-23
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As physical symptoms develop, including opportunistic infections and disease,
one is ultimately diagnosed with AIDS.330
The WWC brief also addressed the issue of whether HIV infection should be.
regarded as a per se disability. 3 ' Maintaining that the language of the ADA does
not preclude HIV infection from being regarded as a disability, the WWC brief
argues, "treating HIV disease as a per se disability is not inconsistent with the
existence of impairment which substantially limits major life activities in every
afflicted individual. For instance, blindness and deafness are impairments that
inherently are substantially limiting." '
The en banc hearing in Runnebaum H resulted in a split opinion: sixjustices
agreed that Runnebaum was not disabled and had failed to show he was fired
because he was regarded as disabled;333 one justice concurred in the judgment
that Runnebaum had failed to establish that he was fired because of a disability
but maintained that the question of whether Runnebaum was disabled was not
before the court;" five justices dissented maintaining that Runnebaum had
presented sufficient evidence of disability and discrimination to defeat summary
judgment."
In Runnebaum II, the majority of the en banc panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor ofNationsBank,
holding that Runnebaum had failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination based on disability in violation of the ADA.336 The court held that
Runnebaum's asymptomatic HIV-infection was not shown to have resulted in a
disability; that Runnebaum had failed to show that his employer perceived him
to be disabled; that Runnebaum had failed to raise a reasonable inference of
unlawful discrimination; and, that Runnebaum's employer had articulated
legitimate 33 non-pretextual, non-discriminatory reasons for Runnebaum's
discharge. 7
To overcome the grant of summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit noted that
Runnebaum was required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA 338 The majority in Runnebaum H/recognized that to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination in a discharge case under the ADA, the plaintiff is
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was (1) a member

(1991); BARTLETT, supra note 326, at 61-63, 279-84; Marianna K. Baum et al., Micro nutrients
and HIV-I DiseaseProgression,9 AIDS 1051-55 (1995)).

330. See id. (citing Lynda S.Doll & Beth A. Dillon, CounselingPersons Seropositivefor
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Their Families, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS,
TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 533 (Vincent T. DiVita, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 1997)).

331.
332.

See id. at 15-23.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

333. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 176 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
334. See id.
335.
336.
337.

See id. at 176-89.
See id. at 175.
See id. at 164-75 (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

338.

See id.
at 164 (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 792).
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of the protected class ("a qualified individual with a disability" as defined by the
ADA); (2) discharged; (3) performing his job at a level that met the employer's
legitimate expectations at the time of his discharge; and (4) discharged under
circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.339
The majority devoted considerable attention to the contention that
Runnebaum was an individual with a disability under the ADA because he was
HIV-positive or was diagnosed with asymptomatic HIV infection.3 4' Although
the previous court opinions involving Runnebaum did not undertake such
analysis, the majority noted that the WWC and the EEOC appearing as amicus
curiae took the position that asymptomatic IV infection is a disability per se
under the ADA. 34 '
Following the approach of all courts undertaking an analysis of whether HIVinfection is a disability, the majority in Runnebaum H began its analysis by
considering the four-prong definition of disability in the ADA. 3 42 Following its
own opinion in Ennis, the Fourth Circuit maintained that a finding of disability
must be made on an individualized basis.343 The court avoided consideration of
the suggestion made in the brief of the WWC that an individualized assessment
does not preclude the fact that a particular condition constitutes a per se
disability. It is clear, for example, that acase-by-case analysis of individuals who
were blind would always result in a finding of disability because blindness would
always constitute an impairment that would substantially limit the individual's
major life activity of seeing.3"
Instead, the majority proceeded to consider (1) whether asymptomatic HIV
infection is a physical or mental impairment, and (2) whether asymptomatic HIV
infection, if an impairment, substantially limits one or more major life
activities.3 45 The majority was quick to note that the Supreme Court had yet to
rule on the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV infection constituted an
impairment, citing the footnote in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, in
which the Supreme Court in 1987 declined to reach a decision on the issue.'
Surprisingly, in the Runnebaum I opinion in 1997, the majority did not seem to
have a clue as to the approach that would be taken by the Supreme Court in
1998.14 ' The Supreme Court in fact relied on a significant body of case law

339. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(2) (1994) and citing Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus.
& Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995)).
340. See id. at 165-73.
341. See id. at 161 n.1, 165-66.
342. See id. at 166 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)).
343. See id. (citing Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59).
344. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 323, at 16-17, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of

Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997)).
345.

See Runnebaum I1,123 F.3d at 167, 170 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A)).

346. See id. at 167 (citing School Bd.of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 n.7
(1987) (declining to decide whether any asymptomatic HIV-infected person could be considered
to have a physical impairment)).
347. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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developed after 1987 adopting an approach that considered relevant the extensive
body of medical and scientific literature, the legislative history, the regulations
promulgated by designated agencies, and the large body of judicial opinions
considering the issue.34 8 The Runnebaum //majority found it easy to dismiss this
body of authority as irrelevant even though the court in Runnebaum I repeatedly
cited the district court opinion in Abbott v. Bragdon 49 The Supreme Court
ultimately upheld this opinion overruling sub-siliention a number of the findings
adopted by the Runnebaum II majority. Rather, the Runnebaum II approach to
determining the applicability of the ADA to the facts established by Runnebaum
involves the court's use of a currently fashionable approach to statutory
interpretation, embraced under the claim ofjudicial restraint that limits, wherever
possible, judicial inquiry in statutory interpretation to the language of the statute
under the rubric of plain language analysis.350 This Runnebaum II approach
adopts three maxims of statutory interpretations: (1) "When confronted with a
question of statutory interpretation, our inquiry begins with an examination of the
language used in the statute;" '' (2) Where "statutory language is plain and
admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise"
since the court should apply the statute in conformity to the language used; 352 and
(3) When "a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord
with its ordinary or natural meaning." '
In taking this approach, the Runnebaum II majority does not follow the
approach to statutory interpretation favored by most courts that begin their
analysis with a consideration of the definition of "impairment" given by the
designated federal agency, in this case the EEOC. 354 Instead, the court looked to
four separate dictionaries for the meaning of a term which it assumes to be
understood as a matter of "standard" usage rather than as a matter of "statutory"
usage and the intent of the drafters of the statute.355 The court focused on the

348.

See id.

349.

912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing issue

of whether procreation and intimate sexual relations are "major life activities"), and rev 'd in part,
524 U.S. 624 (1998). See Runnebaum I, 123 F.3d at 168-70 (citing Abbot, 107 F.3d at 939-41

(holding that asymptomatic HIV is always an impairment and that procreation is a major life
activity))..
350. See Runnebaum 11, 123 F.3d at 167.
351. Id. (citing Faircloth v. LundyPacking Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1077 (1997)).
352. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 143-45 (4th Cir. 1994)).
353. Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).

354. See, e.g., Anderson v.Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F.Supp. 763,773 n.18 (E.D. Tex.
1996) (citing 29 C.F.R., § 1630, app. to Part 1630-Interpretations Guidance to Title I of the APA
§ 1630.2(g) (1995)).

355. Runnebaum 11, 123 F.3d at 167 (citing definition of term "impair" in BLACKS LAW
DICTlONARY 677 (5th ed. 198 1) ("To weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax
or otherwise affect in an injurious manner); WEBSTER's IINEW REVISED UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY
612 (1988) ("[D]ecrease in strength, value, amount, or quality"); WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
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definition of "impair[ment]" as to "make worse by or as if by diminishing in
some material respect" provided in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary.3"' From this type of definition the Runnebaum II majority adopted
the totally unjustified view that an impairment must have some external
observable physical "symptomatic" manifestation. 3" The Runnebawn Ilmajority
reasoned that the required showing of impairment "cannot be divorced from its
dictionary and common sense connotation of a diminution in quality, value,
excellence or strength."" 8 According to the court: "[A]symptomatic HIV
infection is simply not an impairment: without symptoms, there are no
'
diminishing effects on the individual."359
The Runnebaum II majority misconstrued the meaning of both the term
"impairment" and the term "asymptomatic HIV infection" because of its
simplistic understanding of language, namely that words have a clear meaning
independent of context and usage. The term "impairment" as it relates to the
question of whether a person is disabled within the terms of the ADA is to be
understood in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, enacted by
Congress and enforced by designated agencies under duly promulgated
regulations. The term "asymptomatic HIV infection is to be understood in the
context of medical usage rather than simply meaning "no symptoms."' Certain
facts about HIV infection have long been known. For example, an asymptomatic
HIV-infected person's condition may not always be detectable by superficial
physical observation even though such a person is infected and infectious," has
" ' may not engage in "unprotected" intercourse
a compromised immune system,36
without assuming the risk of infecting the sexual partner,3 62 often cannot engage
in specified sexual acts without violating criminal laws that imposes penalties for
such sexual conduct,363 and may not engage in reproduction without some
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 603 (1986) ("[Mlake worse by or as if by diminishing in some respect");
and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (1986) ("[D]eterioration" or

"lessening"). Cf definition of"impairment" in STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 857 (26th ed.
1995) ("[a] physical or mental defect at the level of a body system or organ." The official World
Health Organization definition is "any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological or
anatomical structure of function")).
356. Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 168 (emphasis added) (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 603 (1986)).

357.
358.

Id.
Id. (citing Tones v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986)).

359. fd
360. See generally Redfield & Burke, supra note 6, at 90.
361. See William Long et al., Clinical, Immunologic, and Serologic Findings in Men at Risk
for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: The San FranciscoMen's Health Study, 257 JAMA
326 (1987).
362. Centers for Disease Control Public Health Service Guidelinesfor Counseling and
Antibody Testing to PreventHIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MMWR 509 (1987).

363. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (West 1998); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-16.2(d) (West
1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1997).
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likelihood of producing an infected child.364 The court, in regarding physical
symptoms as the sine qua non of impairment, overlooks the fact that laboratory
tests of asymptomatic HIV-infected persons would reveal the "diminishing"
effects of HIV infection and the "decrease in strength, value, amount or quality"
of the immune system of infected persons by revealing the presence of the virus
in the blood cells of the HIV-infected person as well as by the reduction in the
65
T-cell count of the individual indicating a suppressed immune system.
Certainly, after the Supreme Court's decision inArline, the Runnebaum II court
should have recognized that a finding of disability does not necessarily require
obvious physical manifestation of symptoms.
Instead, the Runnebaum II court adopted a simple two-step analysis in order
to reach the conclusion that asymptomatic HIV infection does not constitute an
"impairment." According to the court: (1) "[t]he plain meaning of 'impairment'
suggests that asymptomatic HIV infection will never qualify as an impairment by
definition, asymptomatic HIV infection exhibits no diminishing effects on the
individual" 3"; and (2) "[e]xtending the coverage of the ADA to asymptomatic
conditions like Runnebaum's where no diminishing effects are exhibited, would
run counter to Congress's intention as explained in the plain statutory
language. 367
The Runnebaum II majority recognized that other courts had found
asymptomatic HIV infection constituted an impairment under the ADA. 3"
However, the court construed these opinions as inappropriately relying on
legislative history that the Runnebaum Ilcourt found ambiguous.3 69 For example,
the House and Senate reports indicated that the term "mental or physical
impairments" includes "infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. 370
By employing the "plain" language approach, the court totally ignored the
legislative record that indicated that Congress understand HIV infection, whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic, to constitute a disability. The distinction was
clearly known to the members of Congress enacting legislation and their
intention to provide disability protection to those who suffered from
asymptomatic HIV infection was consumately clear in the record, through
364. See, e.g., Edward M. Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I with Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173
(1994).
365. See, e.g., Michael S. Saag, Natural History of HIV-I Disease, TEXTBOOK OF AIDS
MEDICINES 45, 49 (Samuel Broder et al. ed. 1994); CECIL, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1908 (James
B. Wyngarden et al. eds., 19th ed. 1992).
366. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
367. Id. at 168.
368. See idl (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that
asymptomaticHIV infection isan impairment under the ADA), rev'd inpart,524 U.S. 624 (1998);

Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)).
369. See id.
370. Id at 168-69 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 303;
H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (III), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 445; S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989)).
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However, the

Runnebaum Hmajority maintained that "the isolated references to IV infection
in the Committee Reports do not distinguish between symptomatic and
asymptomatic conditions as the plain meaning of 'impairment' requires."" 2 The
court's talisman of statutory interpretation, the plain meaning approach, allows
it to reach what it views as an apparently transparent conclusion that "the
statutory meaning of 'impairment' is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, we
have no
reason to resort to the legislative history to ascertain Congress's
intent., , "7
The Runnebaum II majority further considered whether asymptomatic HIV
infection substantially limits one or more of the major life activities assuming
arguendo that asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes an impairment.3 74 Noting
that the ADA itself does not define "major life activity," the court did not turn
to the relevant EEOC regulations and related judicial interpretation. Instead the
court invoked its vehicle of statutory interpretation, "ordinary and natural
meaning. 3 7" The court's analysis focused on dictionary definitions37 of the term
"major" to reach the unsurprising understanding that "[t]hese definitions suggest
that an activity qualifies under the statutory definition as one of the major life
activities contemplated by the ADA if it is relatively more significant or
important than other life activities." 3" The deficiency of the courts approach to
statutory interpretation became clear when one compares it to the information
one can quickly glean from an examination of the EEOC regulations and
guidelines discussed earlier in this article."
One aspect of the Runnebaum I analysis that may prove important in
subsequent litigation relates to what the court suggested must be shown to be the
relationship between the "major life activity" impaired by HIV infection and the
individual plaintiff's relationship to that activity, i.e., must it be an activity that
the individual desires to or would be engaged absent the impairment.3 79 The
Runnebaum Ilmajority comes to the surprising conclusion that "courts need only
consider whether the impairment at issue substantially limits the plaintiff's
ability to perform one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA, not

371.

See, e.g., 136 CONG. REP. H2626 (May 22, 1990) (remarks of Rep. McDermott) ("I am

particularly pleased that this act will finally also extend necessary protection to people with HIV

disease. These are individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum of HIV
infection-asymptomatic HIV-infection, symptomatic HIV infection, or full blown AIDS.").
372. Runnebaum 11, 123 F.3d at 169.
373.
374.

Id.at 168 (citations omitted).
See id. at 170 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994)).

375. Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
376. See id.
(citing WEBSTER II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 718 (1988);
WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363 (1986)).

377. Id.
378. Compare discussion of "major life activity" in Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 171, with 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999) and 29 C.F.R. Appendix to § 1630.2(i).
379. See Runnebaum 11, 123 F.3d at 1,70.
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whether the particular activity that is substantially limited is importantto him."3 s0
This view, of course, leaves open another aspect of the relationship between the
impairment of HIV infection and the ability of the individual to otherwise engage
in the activity; even if reproduction is a major life activity impaired by HIVinfection, would a post-menopausal women, who would not be capable of
engaging in reproductive activity, be regarded as disabled because of the effect
of HIV-infection on the ability to engage in reproductive activity?
The Runnebaum II majority also addressed the question of whether
procreation and intimate sexual relations are major life activities for the purpose
of ADA disability coverage.3 8' Conceding that each of these is a "fundamental
human activity," ' the court, nevertheless expressed doubt as to whether these
are "major life activities" under the ADA."" Without deciding whether the
activities are included within the meaning of major life activities under the ADA,
the Runnebaum II majority concludes, that even assuming that they are covered
activities, asymptomatic HIV-infection does not "substantially limit" the ability
to procreate or engage in intimate sexual relations.3U The court gave significant
weight to the 1988 DOJ Memorandum that opined that some courts might find
asymptomatic HIV infection limits procreation because individuals will forego
having children for fear of producing an infected child, and because individuals
will forego intimate sexual relations because of fear of infecting others.385
However, in the courts view the 1988 DOJ Memorandum equivocated on this
issue since it stated that "there is nothing inherent in the [HIVI infection which
actually prevents either procreation or intimate [sexual] relations."3
The court further held that asymptomatic HIV infection does not limit
procreation or intimate sexual relations for purposes of the ADA." 7 The court
reasoned that asymptomatic IV infected individuals can and have procreated
and have engaged in intimate sexual relations.388 The court sees the decision to
be one of behavior and mores and not one involving a "causal nexus between the
physical effect of the impairment and one of the major life activities."389 One

380.

Seeid. (citingAbbottv. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934,941 (lstCir. 1997), rev'd in part, 524

U.S. 624 (1998)).
381. See id. at 170-72.
382. Id at 170 (citing WWC Brief at 19-20; EEOC Brief at 17).
383. Id. (citing Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that procreation is not one of the major life activities under the ADA); Zatarin v. WDSU
Television, Inc., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'g 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995)).

384. Id. at 172.
385. See id. at 171-72 (discussing Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President
(Sept. 27, 1988), reprintedin8 FAIREMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) No. 641 at 405:4-7) [hereinafter
Kmiec Memorandum].
386. Id. at 171 (citing Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 385, at 405:7).
387. See id. at 172.
388. See id.
389. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994)).
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might observe that under this analysis a monk who had undertaken the vow of
silence would not be disabled because his decision not to speak was not a matter
of physical inability but a choice made in pursuance of self mortification.
To some extent, one must question the integrity of the court's reasoning in
Runnebaum II. It is pervaded with inconsistency. When accused by the dissent
of taking the position that asymptomatic IV-infection is per se not a disability,
the majority countered with the statement "[t]he dissent would, perhaps, have us
hold that asymptornatic HIV infection is per se not a disability under the statute.
As we discuss below, however, we decline to go so far." 3 Later, however, the
court concluded "[t]he plain meaning of 'impairment' suggests that
asymptomatic H1V infection will never qualify as an impairment: by definition,
asymptomatic HIV infection exhibits no diminishing effects on the individual."39'
Similarly, the court initially took the position that "courts need only consider
whether the impairment at issue substantially limits the plaintiff's ability to
perform one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA, not whether
the particular activity that is substantially limited is important to him." 3" In
complete contradiction to this position, the court determined that even if
procreation and intimate sexual relations are major life activities, the lack of
evidence of Runnebaum's intention to otherwise engage in these activities
precluded a finding that he was disabled. 39 The Runnebaum II majority
reasoned:
Even if the statute permitted a finding that asymptomatic HIV infection
substantially limits procreation and intimate sexual relations because of
a person's response to the knowledge of his infection, there is no
evidence in the record that Runnebaum, because of his infection,
forewent having children or engaging in intimate sexual relations.
Nothing in the record indicates that Runnebaum refrained from having
children out of fear that he would pass the virus on to his child. Indeed,
nothing in the record so much as suggests that Runnebaum was at all
interested in fathering a child. Moreover, the record makes clear that
Runnebaum's ability to engage in intimate sexual relations was not
substantially limited by his HIV infection; the record shows that he
concealed his HIV infection from his lover. Ergo, Runnebaum's HIV
infection, if an impairment, does not substantially limit one or more of
the major life activities .
The court's straightforward ability to take contrary positions is only exceeded by
its arrogance in concluding that Runnebaum's decision not to disclose his HIV
status to his partner meant that he was having unprotected sexual relations with

390.
391.
392.

Id at 167. Cf id at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id. at 169.
Id at 170.

393. See id at 172.
394. Id.
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his lover of the kind that would facilitate transmission of HIV. 3" Finally, the
court turned a blind eye to the existence of criminal statutes providing severe
penalties for individuals who engage in intimate sexual relations of the type
likely to facilitate transmission of HIV.3 '
After expounding at length on whether Runnebaum was disabled, an issue
apparently conceded at the trial level,397 the court turned to the actual claim that
NationsBank fired Runnebaum because it regarded him as having an impairment
that substantially limited one or more of the major life activities.3 The court
concluded that none of the evidence submitted by Runnebaum was sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact establishing that NationsBank perceived
Runnebaum as disabled.'" Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence did
not show that Runnebaum was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations,
nor did the evidence show that Runnebaum's termination took place under
circumstances raising a reasonable inference of discrimination.'
The extensive dissent in Runnebaum If"1' not only came to different
conclusions on every issue discussed by the majority, but also expressed the
opinion that there was a disingenuousness in the majority's opinion particularly
with regard to the majority's position that "Runnebaum produced no evidence
showing that he was impaired, to any degree, during the relevant time period."
The dissent points out that at the trial level hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, the employer conceded the issue of existence of "impairment;"
therefore, no evidence was presented on this issue. °3 It is clear from the record
that NationsBank conceded that Runnebaum was disabled under the terms of the
395. See id. Cf id. at 185 (Michael, J., dissenting):
Regarding intimate sexual relations, the majority makes the bold assertion: "the record
makes clear that Runnebaum's ability to engage in intimate sexual relations was not
substantially limited by his HIV infection; the record shows that he concealed his HIV
infection from his lover."... That is too much of a leap for me. I would not presume
to know the status of Runnebaum's 'intimate sexual relations' merely because he has
a boyfriend.
396. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (West 1998); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-16.2(d) (West
1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1997).
397. CompareRunnebaum I1,123 F.3d at 177-78 (where the dissent maintains the defendant
conceded Runnebaum's disability in district court), with id at 165 n.4 (where the majority asserts
that the district court merely assumed "for the purpose of the [summary judgment] motion, that even
an asymptomatic HIV infection may be a disability..." concluding "[wihether asymptomatic HIV
infection is a disability under the statute is primarily a question of law, the facts pertaining to this
issue are sufficiently developed, and the issue was briefed [by Runnebaum's counsel] and argued
on appeal.").
398. See id at 172-76.
399. See id. at 173-76.
400. See id at 175-76.
401. See iad at 176-90 (Michael J., dissenting).
402. Id at 178 (citing id at 169 (majority opinion)).
403. Id. at 177.
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ADA and, consequently he suffered the necessary "impairment. '" 4° In its
memorandum to support a motion for summary judgment, NationsBank
acknowledged that the plaintiff "is a member of a protected class (HIV-positive
being a protected category under 42 U.S.C. § 12,102([2])."0' The dissent also
quoted Runnebaum's lawyer's statement at the en banc hearing where the lawyer
states in part "[i]t was assumed that he [Runnebaum] met the standards under the
Act to be disabled, and the whole case was premised, discovery and everything
was premised from that point forward, on the fact that it was conceded that he
was disabled."' °
The dissent also observed that the majority did not develop an accurate
account of the disabling effects of asymptomatic HIV infection. 7 The dissent
cited medical authorities that describe the effect of the virus' immediate attack
on the immune system, along with the presence of the virus and its reproduction
in the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems with measurable decline in CD4 cell
counts. The dissent explicitly rejected the majority's contention that an ADA
impairment must involve the exhibition of observable physical symptoms.
Instead, the dissent maintained "[n]owhere does the text of the statute, however,
require a 'physical impairment' to be outwardly visible or manifest. The effects
of the HIV virus may not be noticeable to the outside world until the later stages
of the disease, but the body is impaired as soon as the disease enters it."'
Moreover the dissent takes notice of the Fourth Circuit's own opinion in Doe v.
University of MarylandMedical System, Corp., where the court found an HIVinfected surgeon not otherwise qualified to carry out his surgical functions
because of his HIV infection, for the proposition that infectiousness or
contagiousness might constitute an impairment establishing the basis for a claim
that an individual was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.410 Next the
dissent faulted the majority for its total disregard of legislative history, regulatory
interpretation, and the substantial body ofjudicial construction that runs directly

404.

Id.

405.

Id. (citing trial transcript).

406. Id.at 178 (citing en banc Oral Argument, Mar. 5, 1997).
407. See id. at 180.
408. See id. (citing CECIL, supra note 365, at 1908) (describing slow progressive decline in
CD-4 positive cells); Martin A Nowak, AIDS Pathogenesis: From Models to Viral Dynamics in
Patients,10 J.
ACQuIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES& HUMAN RETROVIROLOGY, S I (Supp.
1, 1995) (noting effect of infection in viral levels and decline in CD4 cell counts); Saag, supranote
365, at 46 (describing infection resulting in acute retroviral seroconversion syndrome); Christine
Gorman, Battling the AIDS Virus: There's Still No Cure, but Scientists and Survivors Make

Striking Progress,TIME, Feb. 12, 1996, at 62 (virus is active in body from time of infection)).
409. Id.at 181 (citing Letter from C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General to Douglas W.
Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice,
reprintedin 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) No. 641 at 405:18, 405:19).
410. See id at 181 n.5 (citing Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th
Cir. 1995) (potential for HIV transmission by infected surgeon made him not otherwise qualified)).
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contrary to the various conclusions of the majority. ""
While the dissent did not totally reject the "plain meaning" approach to
statutory interpretation, the dissent maintained that the statutory terms of the
ADA are sufficiently ambiguous to require guidance from the legislative history
and implementing regulation.412 The dissent observed that both the House and
Senate Committee Reports accompanying enactment clearly stated that HIV
infection is to be considered an ADA impairment.4t3 Moreover, specific remarks
of certain sponsors are unequivocal. For example, the statement of Senator
Kennedy noting that "in the particular provision of the legislation we have
pointed out very clearly, if you are asymptomatic and HIV positive, you are
protected." ' In addition, the dissent found confirming support in the relevant
implementing regulations of4 t the
agency, designated by Congress, that are
s
majority.
by
ignored
virtually
The dissent next examined the requirement of the ADA that the impairment
substantially limit one or more major life activities.4" 6 The dissent concluded that
the language of the statute, the legislative history, and implementing regulations
all support the view that procreation and intimate sexual activity are major life
activities.4 t The dissent directed attention to the distinction drawn by the
majority between "substantially limiting as a physical matter",and "substantially
limiting as a behavioral matter."" 8 The dissent noted that this distinction finds
no basis in the statutory text and stated, "[t]here is no requirement that the
impairment physically limit that life activity, nor is there any specification about
how the impairment must substantially limit that activity." '1 Neither is there any
basis in the legislative history, nor in the implementing EEOC regulations for the
distinction drawn by the majority.420 The dissent concluded that "[t]he majority's

411.

See id.
at 181-83.

412. Id. at 181 (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508 (1989)
("[Cloncluding that the text is ambiguous... we seek guidance from legislative history....");
Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1353 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding the ADA's textual definition of
"disability" to be "unilluminating")).
413. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 51, reprinted in1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. §
303, 333) ("It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions,
diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments ....
The term
includes, however, such conditions, diseases, and infections as... infection with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus .. ")). Accord S. REP. No. 101-116 at 22 (1989).
414. Id.at 182 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S10768 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy)).
415. See idat 182-83 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(hXl) (EEOC) (1999)).
416.

See id.at 183.

417. See id.
at 183-85 (citing the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 303, 304; EEOC regulations at 29-C.F.R. §
1630.2(C)).
418.

Id.at 184.

419.
420.

Id.
See id(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2()(ii)).
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distinction goes against common sense. The majority claims that 'as a physical
matter, nothing inherent in the virus substantially limits procreation or intimate
sexual relations."' 42 ' The dissent maintained that contrary to the view of the

majority "[i]t is HIV's physical effects, however, upon procreation and intimate
sexual relations that make it substantially limiting. An individual with HIV
stands a significant chance of infecting others if he engages in these activities,
and this prospect of spreading the disease is a substantial impairment.' ' 2
The dissent also came to a conclusion opposite of the majority on the issue
of whether Runnebaum has presented enough evidence to support his claim of
discrimination based on his "being regarded as having such an impairment." 21
The evidence cited by the dissent includes the opening of Runnebaum's AZT
packages by bank employees, the reaction of Runnebaum's fellow bank
employee upon learning of Runnebaum's infection, and the fact that the
supervisor who fired Runnebaum was informed of Runnebaum's IV infection
before he was actually terminated.424 The dissent concluded contrary to the
majority, that when all the evidence is considered fully and all reasonable
inferences are made in Runnebaum's favor "it becomes clear that there is a
genuine factual issue about whether the bank considered Runnebaum to be
disabled." ' Moreover, the dissent concluded Runnebaum presented evidence
that the employer knew of his HIV status and that the reasons given for his firing
were pretextual.426 The inescapable conclusion, according to the dissent, is that
Runnebaum's evidence created an issue of material fact as to whether
Runnebaum was the subject of427disability discrimination because he was
"regarded as" having a disability.
If the view of the majority in Runnebaum II were to prevail, asymptomatic
HIV-infected individuals would be precluded from claiming protection from
discrimination under the American with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, and other legislation using comparable terms of "disability,"
"impairment" and "substantially limiting one or more major life activities." For
all practical purposes, the opinion of Rwinebaum II set down a rule that
individuals with asymptomatic HIV infection are per se not individuals with a
disability. The approach taken in Runnebaum II relied on a theory of "plain
meaning" interpretation that not only ignores the intent of Congress, the
implementation by designated agencies under lawfully promulgated regulations,
and a developed body of case law, but also employed a doubtful approach to
language itself. The history of the ADA (and the Rehabilitation Act before it)
belies any basis for claiming that the statute is to be interpreted by a "plain
meaning" approach. The Runnebaum Imajority's approach simply ignores the

421.

Id.
at 185.

422.

Id (citing Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 385, at 405:1, 405:7).

423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id at 188.
See iad
at 187-88.
Id.at 186.
See id at 188.
Id.
at 188-89.
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issuance of regulations by an agency, the EEOC, designated in the statute by
Congress to promulgate regulations providing guiding definitions for such
statutory terms as "impairment," "major life activities," and "substantial
limitation. If the Rnnebaum I/approach were to prevail, ADA protection of the
disabled in the context of AIDS would likely be meaningless, since the physical
impairment that the Runnebaum II court apparently required would likely be so
sufficiently debilitating that the individual at that stage of HIV disease would not
be otherwise qualified. The approach of the Runnebaum II majority clearly
undermines the objectives of Congress to exercise a "clear and comprehensive
national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, including those with HIV infection. 2
VIII. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FINDS ASYMPTOMATIC
HIV INFECTION AN IMPAIRMENT THAT CAN SUBSTANTIALLY LIMIT
MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES OF AN INDIVIDUAL
In Bragdon v. Abbott429 the United States Supreme Court attempted

to
provide some guidance in determining the extent to which persons with AIDS
and HIV infection are included within the group of persons who are protected
from unjustified discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act.430
This is the first case that the Supreme Court has heard involving AIDS or HIVinfection.43 While the court seems to have set out a definitive statement that
AIDS and HIV-infection, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, constitute an
"impairment" under the terms of the ADA, the Court was less clear on the
ultimate question of "disability" protection because of its treatment of the
requirement that an impairment "substantially limits major activities of such
individuals." The Court clearly determined that AIDS and HIV infection are not
per se disabilities.
The case arose in 1994 when Sidney Abbott, who knew that she had been
infected with HIV for at least nine years but remained asymptomatic, went to the
4 32
office of her dentist Randon Bragdon for a scheduled dental appointment.
After Abbott disclosed her HIV infection on a registration form, the dentist
examined her teeth and diagnosed a cavity. The dentist then informed the patient
of his policy against filling cavities of HIV-infected patients in his office.
However, the dentist offered to perform the work on Abbott's cavity at a hospital
with no added fee, although Abbott would be required to pay the hospital for any
charge for use of its facilities. Abbott refused Bragdon's offer and brought suit

428.

42U.S.C.§ 12,101(B)(1)(1994).

429.

524 U.S. 624 (1998).

430. See id
431. See Michael Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS: Denial of
Certiorariin HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61 ALA. L. REv. 897

(1998).
432.

See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628.
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against him under Title III of the ADA, 4" and the Maine Human Rights Act
(MHRA), 3' which was not addressed by the Supreme Court.435
The federal district court, considering motions for summary judgment filed
by both parties, primarily addressed the question of applicability of Title III of
the ADA, although it found that the defendants conduct violated both the ADA
and the MlI-IRA.3s Under Title III of the ADA, a place of public accommodation
may not discriminate against an individual on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of services."' However, places of public accommodation
may deny full and equal services to an individual who poses a direct threat to
others. 38 Accordingly, the district court found it was faced with a three step
analysis: (1) whether the dentist's office constituted a place of public
accommodation; (2) whether the plaintiff has a disability within the terms of the
ADA; and (3) whether the requested treatment in the dentist's office does not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 39 The court's discussion
focused on the latter two issues since the defendant did not dispute that his office
was a place of public accommodation; moreover, the court found that the
statutory language and interpretative regulations issued by the Department of
Justice, the agency designated in the statute, provide authority for treating the
professional office of a health care provider as a place of public
accommodation."' The defendant challenged plaintiff's claim with regard to her
disability status on the ground that: (1) asymptomatic HIV does not constitute
a per se disability, and (2) the plaintiff did not present evidence that her
asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits any major life activity."'
The district court recognized that the ADA does not expressly refer to AIDS
or HIV infection within the language of the statute, nor does the statute
specifically refer to any other disease or condition as a per se disability.'42 In
order to determine the applicability of the ADA to a specific disease or condition,
the court recognized the need to apply the regulations promulgated by the agency
which had been delegated authority by Congress under a provision of the statute,
to determine whether an individual with HIV infection has an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity." 3 The court concluded that
433. 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a).
434. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592(1) (West 1989).
435. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629 ("The state law claims are not before us.").
436. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 596 (D. Me. 1995) (concluding that
defendant's conduct violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(b)(2XAXi) and the Maine Human
Rights Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592(1)), aff'd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), and revd
in part, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
437. See id at 584-85 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(2)).
438. See id at 585 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(b)(3)).
439. See id
440. See id at 585 n. I (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36 104 (1996)).
441.

See id.at 585.

442.
443.

See id
See id.

20001

AIDS FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

asymptomatic HIV infection does constitute an impairment within the meaning
of the ADA based on (1) the interpretative guidelines provided by the agency
designated by statute, i.e., the Department of Justice," 4 and (2) a significant body
of judicial opinions that had reached the conclusion that HIV infection
constitutes a physical impairment."' The court did not find it necessary to make
an independent inquiry into the physical effects of HIV infection during the
asymptomatic stage nor to consider the medical side effects ofasymptomatic HIV
infection treatment.
However, the district court refused to follow other courts that assumed that
since the interpretative guidelines, promulgated by the D.O.J., included HIV
among physical or mental impairments, the plaintiff was disabled for purposes
of the ADA.4 Instead the court felt constrained to inquire whether the
plaintiff's asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limited one or more of her
major life activities."" The district court accepted the plaintiff's claim that her
asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limited her reproductive activity
because of potential infection of an offspring, and because of detrimental health
consequences to her from carrying out any pregnancy.4 The court found
reproduction to be among the most fundamental of human activities." 9 Although
the court recognized that the relevant agency guidelines were "somewhat murky"
on what was a major life activity," ° the court concluded that the language of the
ADA employing the term "major life activity,"" and the weight of judicial
authority that had considered the issue recognizing reproduction as constituting
a major life activity,452 persuaded the court that "reproduction constitutes a major
life activity for the purposes of the ADA."453
The court specifically rejected a number of counter arguments. Specifically
the court rejected the argument that asymptomatic HIV infection did not
physically prevent reproduction the way that infertility would.454 Citing the
language of the statute requiring an impairment that "substantially" limits a
444.

See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).

445.
446.

See id.
See id. at 585 n.2 (citing United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. La.

1995); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.N.J. 1995)).
447.

See id.

448.

See id at 585-86.

449. See id.at 586.
450. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996); noting Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881
F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) (finding reproduction does not constitute a major life activity

for the purposes of the ADA, reasoning that one does not engage in reproduction with the same
frequency as walking, seeing, speaking, hearing, learning and working)).
451. Id. (citing Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
452. See id. (citing Erickson v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Kohn Nast &
Graf P.C., 862 F. Supp. at 1320-21; Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
453. Id.
454. See id at 586-87.
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major life activity, the court concluded that "the statute does not contemplate a
complete inability of that individual to engage in a particular major life
activity."' The court found three features of human reproduction that were
limited by the fact a woman is HIV infected including: (1) further danger to a
mother's immune system resulting from pregnancy; (2) risk of infecting a child
during pregnancy, through child birth, or through breast feeding; (3) or fear of
being unable to care for the child beyond the act of conception and period of
gestation."'
While the issue of other major life activities was raised, including limitations
on the intimate sex life of an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual, the court
declined to consider this issue because no evidence was presented on the matter,
and because, in the court's view, the statutory language of the ADA requires "an
individual determination of substantial limitation."" 7 This view, of course,
leaves uncertain the extent of protection provided by the ADA to asymptomatic
HIV-infected persons, an issue that remains even after the issuance of the
Supreme Court's opinion in the case.
Concluding that Abbott was disabled for purposes of Title III of the ADA,
the district court undertook the determination of whether treating Abbott in the
dentist's office posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others.""' The
plaintiff provided the testimony of an expert witness to establish that
implementation of Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recommended
precautionary measures eliminated any significant risk that in-office treatment
would otherwise pose."5 ' The defendant maintained that significant risk was
established by: (I) the obviousness of risk in filling a cavity through the use of
a needle to inject anesthetic creates risk of transmission through percutaneous
needle stick injury, and drilling of the decayed cavity creates risk oftransmission
through spattering and misting of blood and blood saliva;"' (2) by the report of
forty-two documented cases of health care workers who have suffered
occupational transmission of HIV and a report that six percent of all infected
health care workers (as compared to four percent of the general public) do not
have identified risk factors for infection;"' and (3) by a line of case law in which
courts have held the suspension or termination of infected health care workers
does not constitute discrimination under Title III.2
Nevertheless, the court found the defendant's arguments unconvincing,
reasoning that they either involved speculation, or relied on case law that was

455.

Id. at 587 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994)); see also id. at 587 n.5.

456.
457.

See id.
(citing plaintiff's deposition).
Id. at 586 n,4.

458.

See id at 587 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(b)(3)).

459. See id.
at 587-88 (citing CDC, RECOMMENDED INFECTION--CONTROL PRACTICES FOR
DENTISTRY (1993)).
460. See idat 588.
461. See id.
462. See id. at 589-90.
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inapposite.'
The court concluded that the defendant did not meet the
requirements for summary judgment by providing evidence or judicial authority
that supported the conclusion that treatment of the plaintiff in his office
The court
constituted a direct threat to the health and safety of others.'
concluded that the plaintiff had refuted defendant's speculative evidence with the
testimony of a reasonable medical official, in this case an employee of the CDC
whose testimony supported the claim that treatment could be rendered to Abbott
in the dentist's office without any direct threat to the health or safety of Bragdon
and others." 5 The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and
enjoined the defendant from refusing to provide treatment in his office to
individuals infected with HIV solely on the basis of their HIV positive status."6
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on Abbott's claim of violation of the public
accommodation title of the ADA based on the defendant dentist's refusal to treat
her because she was HIV positive.467 The court of appeals agreed that Abbott
was a disabled individual within the purview of the ADA, and that providing her
care would not have posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others." 8
While the court of appeals recognized the ADA was intended to send "a clear
message to those who operate places of public accommodation [that] ,you may
not discriminate against individuals in the full and equal enjoyment of services
on the basis of a disability,"" 9 the court recognized that it was constrained by the
terms of the statute to first determine those who are qualified for protection
against discrimination with reference to the criteria of "disability." The court
made it clear that the "question is first and foremost a question of statutory
construction. " °
Following thetraditional approach to statutory interpretation the court began
"with the words of the statute."'' Citing the three-prong definition of disability
in the ADA, the court determined that it was required to determine whether
Abbott had a disability by finding whether she has (1) a physical or mental
impairment; (2) whether the impairment adversely affected a major life activity;
and (3) whether the impairment substantially limited her ability to engage in the
particular activity.4"
The court of appeals easily found the existence of an impairment, concluding
463.
464.

See id.
See id. at 591.

465.

See id.

466.

See id at 596.

467.

See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 934-37 (Ist Cir. 1997), rev'd inpart,524 U.S.

624(1998).
468. See id. at 937.
469. Id.at 938 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(2) (1994)).
470. Id. (citing Strickland v. Commissioner, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., 96 F.3d 542, 545
(1st Cir. 1996)).
471.

Id (citing United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1994)).

472.

See id.
at 938-39.
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that implementing the relevant agency regulations and the existing body of
judicial authority established that "FIV-positive status, simpliciter, whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic, comprises a physical impairment under the
ADA."47

The court of appeals found the issue of "major life activity" more
problematic. It was noted that the statute does not define the terms at issue, and
the existing case law was divergent on exactly what constitutes a major life
activity.474 While viewing the question as "very close," the court of appeals
concluded that "[r]eproduction (and the bundle of activities that it encompasses)
constitutes a major life activity because of its singular importance to those who
engage in it, both in terms of its significance in their lives and in terms of its
relation to their day-to-day existence.4 7 ' While the court repeatedly spoke in
terms of reproductive activity, the court took the view that reproduction is a
multifaceted activity including the "ability to engage in intimate sexual activity,
gestation, giving birth, childrearing, and nurturing familial relations."47'
Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Runnebaum II, which took a plain meaning
approach to statutory instruction, the First Circuit approached the process of
construing the meaning of the terms "major life activities" in the context of the
statute with reference to prior use of the terms by Congress, and by examining
the construction given by implementing agencies. The court approached the
process as a sophisticated multi-step process. The first step taken by the court
involved consideration of the ordinary meaning of the term:
(I)
Because the term "major life activities" is not defined in the
enactment, we are obliged to construe it in accordance with its
natural (that is, ordinary) meaning. The Court has looked to
familiar dictionary definitions in similar situations. Following
that model here lends support to the classification of
reproduction as a major life activity. The plain meaning of the
These
word "major" denotes comparative importance.
definitions strongly suggest that the touchstone for determining
an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its
significance--and reproduction, which is both the source of all
life and one of life's most important activities, easily qualifies

473. Id.at 939 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996)). The court mistakenly attributed these
regulations to the EEOC; however, these regulations were promulgated by the delegated agency
the DOJ and Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
under Title Ill.,
474.

See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939 (comparing Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797,

804 (N.D. 11. 1996) (finding that reproduction is a major life activity); Erickson v. Board of

Governors of State Colleges, 911 F.Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. I1. 1995); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp.
671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) with Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.

1996) (holding that reproduction is not a major life activity); Zatarin v. WDSU-Television, Inc.,
881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995)).
475. Id. at 941.
476. Id.at 939.
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under that criterion.4"

Second, the court looked to past Congressional usage and the context within
which Congress chose the terms being construed:
(2) Congress lifted the term "major life activities" from the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which usedit in defining an "individual
with handicaps." In that milieu the term was accorded "a broad
definition, one not limited to so called 'traditional handicaps."' In
transplanting this combination of words from the soil of the
Rehabilitation Act to that of the ADA, Congress specifically
directed retention of the original meaning. Had Congress sought to
confine the definition of disability narrowly, it surely would have
written new, more restrictive language instead of borrowing a
descriptive phrase notable for its breadth. It would be wholly
inconsistent with this history to hold that Congress did not envision
reproduction as a major life activity. 78
Third, the court of appeals considered highly relevant the regulations and
interpretive guidance provided by the administrative agency that was delegated
authority by Congress to promulgate such regulations:
(3) [W]e are guided by the regulations, which define "major life
activities" to mean . . . functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. As the regulation itself clearly
indicates, this enumeration is not meant to be exclusive, and
reproduction-one of the most natural of endeavors-fits
comfortably within this sweep. Furthermore, the portion of the
regulations which defines physical impairments to include
physiological disorders affecting the reproductive system, militates
in favor of the same outcome. From the scope of the latter
regulation, we deduce that its drafters considered reproduction to be
a major life activity-otherwise, including reproductive disorders
among the regulation's roster of physical impairments would not
have made much sense. 4 9
Fourth, the court of appeals undertook an effort to determine the intent of
Congress when it enacted the ADA using the statutory language at issue:
(4) [O]ur mission in cases of statutory construction is to discern the
477.

Id. at 939-40 (citations omitted). Among the authorities cited are two dictionaries, THE

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1084 (3d ed. 1992) (defining
"major" as "greater than others in importance or rank"), and WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY, 718 (1989) (defining "major" as "greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest").
478. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940 (citations omitted).
479. Id (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)2)(ii) (a regulation
implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973)).
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legislature's intent. The result that we reach here comports with
evidence in the legislative archives that Congress deemed HIVinfected individuals to be disabled under the ADA. Moreover, the
ADA's precursor, the Rehabilitation Act, had been construed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to protect persons infected with HIV
from discrimination; in enacting the ADA, Congress endorsed the
DOJ's view, noting that "a person infected with [HIV] is covered
under the first prong of the definition of the term 'disability' because
of a substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual
relations.""
This approach to statutory language cannot be faulted for failure to give due
deference to the actual wording of the statute. Nevertheless, rather than
assuming that words have meaning in the abstract, the court of appeals approach
considers ordinary usage as establishing the parameters for meaning, but not
sufficient for establishing the actual meaning. The context in which the use of
the words occurs is stressed, along with the interpretive guidance provided by the
agency delegated authority to promulgate supporting regulations. This approach
is certainly more likely to reach an understanding of the language of a statute as
intended by the drafters of the legislation, than one that assumes words have
some meaning without reference to context or usage.
The court of appeals considered and rejected a number of arguments that
would militate against recognition of reproduction as a major life activity
including: (1) the assertion that reproduction represents a lifestyle choice, and
an activity in which many choose not to engage;48 and (2) the claim that
"reproduction" is to be distinguished from such activities as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working based on the frequency of performance." 2 The court of appeals, on
the contrary, finds "[t]here is no evidence that Congress intended either
frequency or universality to operate as a restriction on the definition of 'major
life activities. ' Similarly, the court noted that the assertion that reproduction
is a life style choice is without merit because voluntary restraint in no way denies
a life activity its significance. As the court notes "[s]peaking is undoubtedly a
major life activity, but there are those (say, monks who have taken vows of
silence) who choose to eschew it.""
While the court of appeals does not reach a dispositive position, it does
consider whether it is necessary for a particular individual with an impairment
to show that he or she would otherwise engage in the major life activity that is

480. Id. at 94243 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 28 n.18 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. § 445).
481. See id. at 940.
482. Id.

483.
484.

Id.at 941.
Id.
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substantially limited by the impairment.485 The court of appeals suggests that the
individualized finding that the impairment substantially limits a major life
activity is not a particularized determination."" According to the court of
appeals, "[t]he need for this case-by-case analysis of disability does not
necessarily require a corresponding case-by-case inquiry into the connection
' The court suggests "it might
between the plaintiff and the major life activity."487
be enough for a court to consider only whether a given impairment substantially
limits a particular plaintiff without considering whether the activity is of
particular import to her."4" Since the instant case took the form of a grant of
summary judgment, the court of appeals assumed arguments that Abbott needed
to establish a nexus between her impairment and a major life activity in which
she would otherwise engage.489 The court of appeals concluded that the record
sufficiently established that Abbott's HIV infection materially affected her
decision not to engage in reproductive activity.""
Finally, the court rejected the argument that Abbott faced a relatively small
chance of infecting any child she bore because of anti-viral therapy.49'
According to the defendant, an HIV-infected mother faced a twenty-five percent
risk of transmitting HIV to her child if she were not treated with an anti-viral
therapy. However, with anti-viral therapy employing AZT, the risk of
transmission can be reduced to as low as eight percent. 2 The court, however,
rejected the argument that the reduction of risk of transmission meant that HIVinfection provided no impediment to reproductive activity. Instead the court
concluded that an eight percent risk of passing HIV to an offspring continued to
provide a substantial barrier to reproductive activity by HIV-infected mothers. 493
The conclusion that Abbott's HIV positive status constituted a physical
impairment that substantially interfered with her major life activity of
reproduction resulted in a finding that she was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, 4 the court of appeals then turned its attention to the question of whether
Abbott posed a "direct threat" if she were to be treated in a dentist's office.495
The answer to this question, according to the court, must be based on current
medical knowledge or the best available medical evidence. 4" The court found
the district court's reliance on expert testimony insufficient as the basis for its
determination that Abbott's HIV infection did not pose a direct threat to others

485.

See id.

486.
487.

See id.
Id.

488. Id.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

See id.at 941-42.
See id.
See id at 942.
See id
See id
See id. at 948.
Id. at 943.

496.

See id. at 944 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1996)).
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if she were to receive dental treatment in Bragdon's office.4 Instead, the court
found the CDC recommendation for "universal precautions" and the
recommendations of the American Dental Association for safe dental procedures
provided a sufficient basis for determining that Abbott could be treated in the
dentist's office without providing a direct threat to the health or safety of
others."' The court indicated a sensitivity to the safety concerns of health care
workers like Dr. Bragdon,499 suggesting a need for courts to continue to carefully
examine the evidence with regard to the danger posed by a contagious or
infectious disease such as HIV. The court concluded "[w]e also recognize that
cases of this kind are necessarily fact-sensitive; had the patient required more
invasive treatment or had the dentist proffered stronger evidence of direct threat,
the result may well have differed."'" The court came to the principled position
that discrimination cannot be justified on the mere existence of HIV infection;
instead, disparate treatment of those infected with HIV must be based on
scientific and medical evidence that establishes that the HIV-infected person
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others under Title III of the ADA
(and presumably may not be discriminated against in employment if otherwise
qualified under Title I of the ADA). 50
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision
affirmed the court of appeals finding that a person with asymptomatic HIV
infection is a disabled person within the purview of the ADA, but by an
effectively unanimous agreement the Court vacated and remanded the judgment
of the issue of whether Abbott's HIV-infection posed a direct threat to the health
and safety of others in the context of routine treatment in a dentist's office."
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy applied a three-step process to
determine whether Abbott's infection constituted a disability under the ADA:
(1) whether asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a physical impairment; (2)
whether reproduction and child bearing constitute major life activities; and (3)
whether asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limits the activities of
reproduction and child bearing. 3
Eschewing a plain language analysis, in an effort to determine the facial
meaning of the ADA, the Court's approach to statutory construction placed
heavy reliance on the interpretation's given by the DOJ, and by the prior
interpretation of previously enacted statutes to which Congress referred in
enacting the ADA, most significantly the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.' The
497.
498.

See id. at 945.
Id.at 945-46 (citing CDC, supra note 459; AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY

ON AIDS, HIV INFECTION AND THE PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY (1991)).

499.
500.
501.

See id. at 949.
Id.
See id.

502.
503.

See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
See id.
at 631 (applying 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994)).

504.

See id.
(citing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 706(8XB)(1994) and the Fair

Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1989)).
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majority noted the fact that the actual language of the ADA was drawn from the
Rehabilitation Act. According to the Court, this gave rise to an implication that
the terms were to be construed in accordance with the pre-existing
interpretations. 5 Moreover, the majority noted the explicit direction of
Congress to courts that, except as otherwise provided in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the statute is not to "be construed to apply a lesser standard than
the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act' of 1973 or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.""'
The majority determined that the first regulations addressing the question of
what constitutes a "physical impairment" were issued in 1977 by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). 50 7 HEW was the designated agency
responsible for coordinating the implementation and enforcement of section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.'" The HEW regulations defined "physical or mental
impairment" to include "any physiological disorder... affecting one or more of
the following body systems [including]... hemic [blood] and lymphatic...."'
The majority noted that HEW did not provide a list of specific disorders
constituting a physical or mental impairment because of concern that any specific
enumeration of disease conditions might not be comprehensive. 1 ° The Court
also noted that HIV could not be included in a list of specific disorders
constituting physical impairments under section 504 since the causal agent of
AIDS was not discovered until 1983."' In 1980, responsibility for
implementation and enforcement of section 504 was transferred to the DOJ."2
The agency "adopted verbatim the HEW definition of physical impairment" in
its regulations that remain in force today." 3
Unlike the district court or the First Circuit Court of Appeals in their earlier
consideration of the case, the majority undertook an extensive analysis of the
medical and scientific understanding of HIV infection as part of its analysis to
determine whether HIV infection constitutes a physical impairment under the
ADA. The majority adopted the view that HIV infection is not a series of
discrete conditions, but it is a disease following a set course of development.".
The Court noted that at the initial or primary stage of HIV infection, the so-called
"acute" stage, the virus concentrates in the blood and immediately attacks the

505.

See id. (citing FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 434-38 (1986);

Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65
(1945)).
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
334).

Id. at 631-32 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a)).
Id. at 632.
See id. (citing Exec. Order No. 11914, 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1980)).
Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(jX2)(i) (1997)).
See id at 633 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685, reprintedin 45 C.F.R. § at 84, App. A., p.

511.

See id.

512.
513.

See id (citing Exec. Order No. 12250, 3 C.F.R § 298 (1981)).
Id (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(bX!) (1997)).

514.

See id. ("The diseases follows a predictable and, as of today, an unattenable course.").
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person's immune system." 5 Primary HIV infection produces a significant
decline in white blood cells or CD4+ cells." The Court emphasized that HIV
infection does not involve a latency or incubation period. With infection, the
individual often experiences "[m]ononucleosis-like symptoms, often . . .
accompanied by fever, headache, enlargement of the lymph nodes
(lymphodenopathy), muscle pain (myalgia), rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal
disorders, and neurological disorders." ' These symptoms abate in two to three
weeks."' 8 FIV antibodies can be detected in the blood stream within three weeks,
and the virus can be detected in the blood stream within ten weeks." 9
When the initial symptoms subside, the person is diagnosed as being in the
"asymptomatic" phase. The majority made clear, however, its opinion that there
are significant effects of HIV infection that are manifest in the infected
individual. 2 The Court was emphatic in its understanding of the persistent
physiological effects of HIV infection. According to the Court "[a]fter the
symptoms associated with the initial state subside, the disease enters what is
referred to sometimes as its asymptomatic phase. The term is a misnomer, in
some respects, for clinical features persist throughout, including
lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial
infections."5 '' The Court notes that a person passing through the so-called
asymptomatic phase may appear to have reduced observable physical
manifestations of infection as a result of increased viral migration throughout the
circulatory system and an increased viral concentration in the lymph nodes with
corresponding decrease CD4+ count.5"
The Court notes that a person is diagnosed with AIDS when the CD4+ count
drops below 200 cells/mm3 of blood or when CD4+ cells comprises less than
fourteen percent of the body's total lymphocytes. 23 It is at this stage that the
HIV-infected person is likely to contract various opportunistic infections and
diseases such as pneumocystis carinii pneumonic, Karposi's sarcoma, and nonHodgkin's lymphoma. 24

515.
516.
517.
518.

Id.
Seeid, at634-35.
Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
See id.

519. See id.
520. See id.
521. Id.
522. See id. at 636.
523. See id (citing HHS/CDC, 1993 Revised ClassificationSystem for HIV Infection and
ExpandedSurveillanceCaseDefinitionforAIDSAmongAdolescents andAdults,41 MMWR, Rep.

1-2 (P.Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed.
No. RR- 17 (Dec. 18, 1972); OsMoND, AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.
Current Trends in the Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS
1994); Saag, supranote 11, at 207; Ward et al.,
in THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT of AIDS 3 (Merle A. Sande & Paul A. Volberding eds., 5th ed.

1997)).
524. See id (citing P. Cohen & P. Volberding, ClinicalSpectrum of HIV Disease, in AIDS
KNOWLEDGE BASE 4.1-7 (1994); Saag, supra note 1I,at 207-09.
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On the basis of the statutory criteria for an ADA impairment, the majority
concluded asymptomatic HIV infection qualifies as a statutory impairment.
According to the majority, "[i]n light of the immediacy with which the virus
begins to damage the infected person's white blood cells and the severity of the
disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of its infection.""S The
majority reasoned that HIV infection is a disability under the ADA because HIV
infection results in "immediate abnormalities" in the composition of an
individual's blood and significantly depreciates a person's white cell count and
dramatically affects the persons lymph nodes. 26 Further, the majority
determined that HIV infection must be considered a physiological disorder
because of its "constant and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic
[blood] and lymphatic systems."" 7 The majority's holding results in a finding
that HIV infection, whether asymptomatic or symptomatic, is a per se impairment
within the terms of the ADA.
Of course, a finding of a per se impairment does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that a person with asymptomatic HIV infection is disabled. A
showing must be made that the impairment substantially limits a major life
activity of the infected individual. 28 It is important to note that although the
Court undertakes an analysis of whether reproduction and child bearing
constitute major life activities, the majority makes clear that there are likely a
wide range of other significant major life activities whose exercise is
compromised by IlV infection. The Court nevertheless limited its discussion to
those activities that were in the record of the case before the Court. The Court
stated unequivocally:
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course ofthe disease, its effect
on major life activities of many sorts might have been relevant to our
inquiry. Respondent and a number of amici make arguments about
HIV's profound impact on almost ever phase of the infected person's
life. In light of these submissions, it may seem legalistic to circumscribe
our discussion to the activity of reproduction. We have little doubt that
had different parties brought the suit they would have maintained that an
HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life
activities. 29
This observation becomes important if subsequent litigation results in judicial
authority requiring an individualized determination of whether the impairment
of HIV infection results in a substantial limitation on the litigant's ability to
engage in the activity of procreation. Gay men, menopausal women, men who
have had a vasectomy, women who have had a hysterectomy, persons who are
otherwise sterile, or children may be all faced with the need to identify other
525.
526.
527.

Id. at 637.
Id.
Id

528.
529.

See id.
Id (citing brief of respondents and anici).
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major life activity in order to establish that they are disabled within the terms of
the ADA.
In determining whether reproduction constitutes a major life activity, the
majority cited the Court of Appeals' discussion of the term "major"53 and
concluded that human reproduction, and the closely related activities of child
rearing, constitute major life activities in those who undertake them because
"[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life
process itself."53' The majority found nothing in the statute to support the
petitioner's argument that Congress intended the ADA only to cover aspects of
a person's life which have "a public, economic, or daily character." '32 Instead,
the Court found that the regulations promulgated to implement the ADA and its
predecessor suggest the contrary.5 33
Similarly, the Court found no merit to the claim that HIV infection does not
substantially impede a woman from engaging in reproductive activity. The Court
cited a number of aspects of IRV infection that significantly interfered with an
FHV-infected individual's ability to engage in reproductive activity including:
(1) a significant risk of infecting a sexual partner (sexual transmission of HIV);534
(2) a significant risk of infecting a child during gestation or childbirth (perinatal
transmission);535 (3) added costs of long term health care for the child that must
be examined and perhaps treated for HIV infection;5 36 and (4) possible violation
of state statutes forbidding persons with HIV infection from having sex with
others, regardless of consent.537
The Court rejected the assertion that an HIV-infected woman could reduce
the likelihood of giving birth to an infected infant from twenty-five percent to
eight percent by the use of anti-retroviral therapy, therefore reducing any
limitation on their reproductive activity resulting from their 1IIV infection. The

530.
531.
532.

Id. at 638 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939, 940 (1997)).
Id
Id.

at 638-39.
533. See id.
534.

See id.at 639-40 (citing Osmond & Padian, Sexual Transmission of HIV, in AIDS

eds., 2d ed. 1994) (20% of male partners of
KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.9-8, 2nd tbl. 2 (P. Cohen et al.
women with HIV becomes HIV-positive themselves); Haverkos & Battjes, Female-to-Male
Transmission ofHIV, 268 JAMA 1855-56, tbl. (1992) (25% risk of female to male transmission)).
535. See id.at 640 (citing STRAPANS & FEINBERG, MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS 32

(studio reps 13% to 45% risk of infection, with average of approximately 25%); Connor et al.,
supra note 364, at 1173-76 (placing risk at 25.5%); Report ofa Consumer Workshop. Maternal
Factors Involved in Mother-to-Child Transmission ofHIV-1, 5 J.ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROME,1019-20 (1992) (collecting 13 studies placing risk between 14% and 40% with most

studies falling within the 25% to 30%)).
536. See id.at 641.
537. See id. (citing IOWA CODE § 139.1 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18601.1(2) (1994); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 50-18-112 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-3.5(3) (Supp. 1997); § 26-6-5 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.36.01 l(l)(b) (Supp. 1998)).
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Court found that even an eight percent possibility of transmitting HIV to an
offspring is to be regarded as significant."' It is clear that the statistical other
concerns identified by the Court were a significant basis for its decision;
however, from the respondent's revelation that her HIV infection controlled her
decision not to have a child was "unchallenged." '
Just as the Court found support for its view of the meaning of "impairment"
in the legislative history, implementing regulations of the ADA, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Court found similar support for its view that the
disability provision of the ADA was meant to include individuals with
asymptomatic HIV infection.' 0 The Court first looked to interpretations of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that extended coverage to those with HIV infection.
The Court began by citing the 1988 Memorandum opinion issued by the Office
of Legal Counsel of the DOJ concluding that the Rehabilitation Act "protects
symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals against discrimination
in any covered program."'" The Court also noted that every agency that
addressed the problem before enactment of the ADA reached the conclusion that

those with HIV infection were handicapped" 2 and that existing agencies

addressing the issue since enactment of the ADA have adhered to the conclusion
that HIV infection constitutes a handicap or disability. u 3 Further the Court
observed that every court that had addressed the issue of coverage under the
Rehabilitation Act before the ADA was enacted in 1990 concluded that

asymptomatic HIV infection satisfied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
handicap.'

538. See id.
539. Id. (citations omitted).
540. Id. at 642.
541. Id (quoting Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected
Individuals, 12 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 264, 264-65 (Sept. 27, 1998)).
542. See id. at 643 (citing FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE MANUAL APP. 6D, 8 FEP
MANUAL 405.352 (Dec. 23, 1998); In re David Ritter, No. 03890089, 1989 WL 609697, *10
(EEOC Dec. 8, 1989)).
543. See id. (citations omitted).
544. See id at 644 (citing Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1457 (1 Ith Cir. 1990); Baxter v.
Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act)); Ray v.
Sch. Dist, of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla, 1987); Thomas v. Atascadero
Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1987); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v.
Board of Ed. of New York, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335-37 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1986); see also cases
finding HIV to be a handicap without distinguishing between symptomatic and asymptomatic:
Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit School DistrictNo. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-07
(S.D. 11. 1998); AssociationofRelations andFriendsofAIDSPatientsv. RegulationsandPermits
Administration, 740 F. Supp. 95, 103 (P.R. 1990) (Fair Housing Amendments Act); Martinez ex
rel. Martinez v. School Boardof Hillsborough City, 861 F.2d 1502-06 (11 th Cir. 1988); Chalkv.
United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 701-06 (9th Cir. 1988) Doe v. Dalton Elementary
School DistrictNo. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 445-45 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Local 1813, AFOE v.United
States Departmentof State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.C. 1987).
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The Court adopts a traditional maxim of statutory interpretation ignored by
the Fourth Circuit in Runnebaum II,and not adequately stated by the First Circuit
in its opinion in Abbott v. Bragdon, that needs to be emphasized in face of
demands for plain language analysis which remains sensitive to legislative
history. The Court clearly states "[w]hen administrative and judicial
interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the
intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well." '45
The majority maintains that if Congress had done nothing more than integrate the
existing language of the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA, given the interpretation
that language had been given, it would be evidence that Congress intended the
ADA's disability provision to include asymptomatic HIV infection.5" The
majority points out that Congress was well aware of the 1988 DOJ Memorandum
opinion and, moreover, specifically endorsed the analysis and conclusions of the
DOJ Memorandum in the House and Senate reports accompanying the ADA."'
The Court also found significant that Congress had incorporated the same
definition into its earlier enactment of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1988. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the regulations promulgated in 1989 by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development construed the Fair Housing
Act as providing protection for persons with HIV infection.' 9
The Court also found persuasive the regulations promulgated by the DOJ, as
the agency directed by Congress to issue implementing regulations for Title III,55
including "HIV infection (symptomatic and asymptomatic)" in the list of
disorders constituting a physical impairment.55' Moreover, the Court noted that
the DOJ in its Title III TechnicalAssistanceManual,concludes that persons with
552
asymptomatic HIV infection fall within the ADA's definition of disability.
The Court found similar authority in the regulations and guidance from other
agencies involved in administration and enforcement of the ADA, including the
EEOC and the Department of Transportation.553
545.

Abbott, 524 U.S. at 645 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-87 (1978)).

546.

See id. at 644-45.

547. See id.
at 645 (citing H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 52 (1990); H.R. REP.No. 101-485, p.
2 at 28 n.18; S. REP. No. 101-116, pp. 21-22 (1989) (all endorsing the conclusion of the DOJ
Memorandum that HIV infection, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, qualified as a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973)).
548. See id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602(hX1) (1994)).
549. See id.
(citing 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,3245 (1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1997)).
550. See id.
at 646 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,186(B) & (0) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997)).
551. Id.(citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(!)(ii)).
552. See id (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILrrIES ACT; TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 9 (Nov. 1992)).
553. See id at 647 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (1994) (authorizing EEOC to issue regulations
under Title 1); 42 U.S.C. § 12,134(2) (authorizing DOJ to issue regulations implementing public

service provision of Title 11, subtitle A); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,149, 12,164, 12,186, 12,206(C) (1994
& Supp. 111 1997) (authorizing Sec. of Trans. To issue regulations relevant provisions of Title II
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Although Abbott was found to have a disability under the ADA, the Court
recognized that she could be refused treatment in a dentist's office if her HIV
infection "pose[d] a direct threat to the health and safety of others" that could not
be "eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services [in the dentist's office]."'5 4 The Court
assessed the possible risks from the point of view of providers of service,
stressing that "the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective
evidence."' " The Court recognized that a provider of services "belief that a
significant risk existed,
even if maintained in good faith, would not relieve him
6
from liability.""11

While the Court recognized that the views of public health authorities, such
as the United States Public Health Services, CDC, and the National Institute of
Health deserve special weight and authority, the Court maintained that the views
of these agencies are not conclusive."5 7 The majority concluded that the court of
appeals was right to have rejected the trial court's total reliance on the affidavit
of a CDC official, 5 ' but the majority also faulted the court of appeals for its
reliance on the 1993 CDC Dentistry Guidelines and the 1991 American Dental
Association Policy on HIV. s5 9 The Court first faulted the Fourth Circuit for not
recognizing the limited importance of the CDC guidelines, for in the Court's
view "the Guidelines do not necessarily contain implicit assumptions conclusive
of the point to be decided. The Guidelines set out CDC's recommendations that
the universal precautions are the best way to combat the risk of HIV
transmission. They do not assess the level of risk."" ° Similarly, the majorityfaulted the Fourth Circuit on its reliance on the Dental Association policy
statement. The majority concluded it is not clear whether the Dental Association
policy was based on an assessment of the dentist's ethical and professional duties
rather than a scientific assessment of the risk faced by the dentist, which is the
basis of the ADA's statutory concerns.5 6' According to the Court "[e]fforts to
clarify dentists' ethical obligations and to encourage dentists to treat patients
with HIV infection with compassion may be commendable, but the question
under the statute is one of statistical likelihood, not professional
responsibility."562 Neither did the Court find the deposition the petitioner placed
and 111)). These agencies concluded HIV infection is an ADA physical impairment under the ADA.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1)(iii) (1997); 49 C.F.R. § 37.3, 38.3 (1977); 56 Fed. Reg. 13,858 (1991).
554. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 648-49 (applying 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(BX3) (1994). Cf 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12,111(3), 12,113(B)).
555. Id at 649 (citing School Bd. Of Nassau City v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987); 28
C.F.R. § 36.208(e) (1997)).
556. Id.

557. See id. at 650 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; 28 C.F.R. p.36, App. B,p.6 2 6 (1977)).
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.

See id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 945 n.7 (1997)).
See id. at 651 (citing Abbott, 107 F.3d at 945-46).
Id. at 651-52.
See id. at 652.
Id
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into the trial court record determinative evidence on the extent of the danger of
airborne transmission of IRV in the setting of dental treatment using high-speed
drills, nor were the reports of dental workers who had possible occupational
transmission of HIV sufficient to establish the kind of risk showing required by
the statute." The Court found itself constrained on the question of risk by what
it felt was an inadequate record. The Court pointed out that "we have not had
briefs and arguments directed to the entire record."' The Court remanded the
question of risk to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the petitioner had
presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact on the question of
risk.565
Justice Stevens,joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority stating
that there was no doubt that the asymptomatic HIV infection of Abbott placed her
within the category of ADA disability.' However, Justice Stevens expressed
a preference for outright affirmance, without remand on the dire of threat because
the respondent had failed to raise a triable issue of fact on the direct threat issue,
and because the court of appeals' decision was based on the record.567
Justice Ginsberg filed a concurring opinion agreeing that the case should be
remanded on the direct threat issue because it is wise to "[err] if at all, on the side
of caution."' However, Justice Ginsberg indicated that she would have found
Abbott disabled both under the actual disability prong of the ADA definition, and

the "regarded as" standard. 5' Justice Ginsberg's opinion also suggested other
major life activities might be cited by HIV infected individuals.57 ° Justice
Ginsberg observed "[tihe disease inevitably pervades life's choices: education,
employment, family and financial undertakings. It affects the needs for and, as
this case shows, the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction of others

to the impairment."5 '

Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment and dissenting, in part,
maintained that Abbott did not establish that her HIV infection substantially
limited a major life activity." Justice O'Connor found reproductive activity to

be different in kind from the representative life activities set out in the applicable
regulation that includes "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."5 3 Moreover,

Justice O'Connor concluded that the First Circuit failed to adequately determine

563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.

See id.
at 652-53.
Id. at 654.
See id. at 655.
See id.
(Stevens, J.,
concurring).
See id.
Id at 656 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
Id.

570.
571.

See id.

572.
573.

Id.
See id. at 664 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.at 665.
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whether Abbott's HIV infection posed a direct threat." 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a two part dissent, joined in the first part by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, and joined in the second part by Justice O'Connor."'
In the first part of his dissent the Chief Justice stressed the need for an
"individualized" inquiry to determine whether an individual has a disability
under the ADA since the disability determination must be made "with respect to
an individual" and because the "major life activities" must be those "of such
individual."" 6
The Chief Justice accepted for the sake of analysis that Abbott's
asymptomatic HIV infection constituted an ADA impairment since it was not
disputed by Bragdon." However, on the issue of whether reproduction
constituted a major life activity, the Chief Justice maintained the fact that being
"important in a person's life" is not dispositive" Rather, the Chief Justice
maintained that the major life activities recognized in the relevant agency
regulations required a certain regularity engagement." 9 According to the Chief
Justice "[t]he common thread is rather that the activities are repetitively
performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning
individual. They are thus quite different from the series of activities leading to
the birth of a child."580
The Chief Justice extended his argument that, even assuming reproduction
was a major life activity, asymptomatic HIV infection would not substantially
limit engagement in reproduction."8 ' According to the Chief Justice "[t]he record
before us leaves no doubt that those so infected are still entirely able to engage
in sexual intercourse, give birth to a child if they become pregnant, and perform
the manual tasks necessary to rear a child to maturity." ' 2 From the Chief
Justice's point of view, asymptomatic HIV infection may give an infected person
reasons for not engaging in reproduction, but HIV infection does not 'physically"
substantially lessen the ability of a person to engage in reproduction." 3
According to the Chief Justice, "[w]hile individuals infected with HIV may
choose not to engage in these activities, there is no support'in language, logic, or
our case law for the proposition that such voluntary choices constitute a 'limit'
on one's own life activities.""8 Nor did the Chief Justice find the invocation of
the statutory terms "substantially lessen" significant, since in his view there is no
evidence that because of HIV infection Abbott has any less ability than others to
574.
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'
engage in reproductive activity "as a matter of mere physical ability."585
The
Chief Justice also did not look kindly on the assertion that Abbott's HIV
infection would not permit her to complete the process of child rearing because
of his reading of the word "limits" (which is limited to the
present tense) and his
586
view that child rearing necessarily looked to the future.
The Chief Justice also found it significant that there was no evidence in the
record that, prior to becoming infected with HIV, Abbott's major life activities
included reproduction. According to the Chief Justice "[t]here is absolutely no
evidence, that absent the HIV, respondent would have had or was even
considering having children."587 The Chief Justice concluded that given this
evidence, Abbott does not meet the ADA's definition of "disability" because it
requires that the major life activity at issue be "of such individual.""88 It should
be recalled that even the Runnebaum !Imajority suggested it was not necessary
to determine that the particular individual would otherwise engage in the major
life activity which the ADA impairment substantially limited. 89 Also, it is
important to note that the majority in Bragdon specifically concluded
"[tiestimony from the respondent that her HIV infection controlled her decision
not to have a child is unchallenged." 5 The spectre thus remains that it may be
necessary for an asymptomatic HIV infected individual claiming disability
protection under the ADA to establish that there is a particular recognized major
life activity in which they would otherwise engage, but for his or her HIV
infection.
Part 11 of the dissent established agreement with the majority's decision to
remand the case on the issue of "direct threat" but expressed disagreement with
the majority's grant of special weight and authority to the views of public health
authorities such as the United States Public Health Service, CDC, and the
National Institute of Health."' According to the Chief Justice "[i]n litigation
between private parties originating in the federal courts, I am aware of no
provision of law or judicial practice that would require or permit courts to give
some scientific views more credence than others simply because they have been
endorsed by a politically appointed public health authority (such as the Surgeon
General)."" 9 In the Chief Justice's view, expert opinions, including that of
officials of the public health authority, "must stand on their own." ' 9 The Chief
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Justice concluded that the petitioner presented more than enough evidence to
avoid summary judgment on the direct threat question.
On remand in an opinion issued on December 20, 1998, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its conclusion that Bragdon violated the ADA by
refusing to treat an HIV-positive dental patient in his office.3 9' The three-judge
panel concluded that Bragdon produced no legitimate medical or scientific
evidence to show that providing routine, in-office dental care to an HIV-infected
patient would subject him or others to any significant direct threat of contracting
HIV infection.'" The court maintained that Bragdon's claims regarding the risks
of HIV transmission from patient to dentist, where there was compliance with
CDC "universal precautions," were "too speculative" and "too tangential" to
create a genuine issue of material fact.5 The court of appeals panel viewed the
1993 CDC guidelines as "competent evidence" by a recognized public health
authority that the provision of routine dental care of the type at issue in the
litigation before the court could be provided without threat of infection to the
dentist or assisting health care worker.597 Moreover, the court noted that the brief
submitted by the dental association confirmed that the organization's 1991 policy
statement on the treatments of HIV-positive patients originated with the
association's committee for scientific affairs, not its committee on ethics. 98
Nevertheless, the court issued a caveat recognizing that future medical or
scientific evidence might provide a basis for a different conclusion on the issue
of direct threat.5 According to the court "[t]he state of scientific knowledge
concerning this disease is evolving, and we caution future courts to consider
carefully whether future litigants have been able, through scientific advances,
more complete research, or special circumstances, to present facts and arguments
warranting a different decision."'
The consequence of this ruling is a final
affirmation of the grant of summary judgment by the district court in 1995
enjoining Bragdon from refusing to provide in-office care to patients based solely
on their HIV infection.
CONCLUSION: SOME REMAINING ISSUES

The issue of "direct threat" under Title III" and the issue of "otherwise
qualified under Title I" are fact specific and provide the basis for continuing
litigation under the ADA, even with the effective ruling of the United States
Supreme Court that HIV-infection is an ADA per se impairment.
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The Court shed little light on what actually constitutes a direct threat to the
health or safety of others. While the Court indicated that significant weight
should be given to the policies and statements of the public health authorities
such as the United States Public Health Services, the CDC and the National
Institute of Health, 3 the Court provided no guidance for determining what
constitutes a significant risk to others.
The question of what constitutes a "major life activity" will also likely
continue to be litigated. Because of reference to "intimate sexual relations" in
the 1988 DOJ Memorandum,' it is possible that a court considering the matter
would reach the conclusion that "intimate sexual relations" constitutes a major
life activity under the ADA. The similarity to the importance of "reproductive
activity" and the fact that it seems to be in the same class of, if not often a related
activity. One can anticipate similar arguments relating to "substantially limits"
in terms of concern with the possibility of infecting a sexual partner and the
possibility of violation of statute laws prohibiting certain sexual relations by
HIV-infected persons.
An issue may also arise as to whether an HIV-infected individual remains
disabled if drug therapies become available that may halt the reproduction of the
virus, restore CD4+ count, or even neutralize HIV. This matter gains
significance when one recalls that the majority began its discussion of IRVinfection with the sentence "[t]he disease follows a predictable and, as of today,
an unalterable course." 5 The EEOC view is that the determination of disability
should be made without regard to the ameliorative effects ofmedication.' Some
courts, however, have found that when medication improves an individual's
physical condition there is no disability.' 7 The Court in Bragdon limited its
consideration to the impact of medication in reducing perinatal transmission of
HiV.
Another area that needs to be resolved is that of HIV infected health care
workers and whether they are otherwise qualified. The existing case law permits
restriction, reassignment or term ination ofHIV-infected health care workers who
are engaged in what has been characterized as exposure-prone procedures.608
This body ofjudicial opinion has held that such treatment of HIV-infected health
care workers does not constitute discrimination under Title I of the ADA' or
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under section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973610 because such HIV-infected
health care workers are not "otherwise qualified." Such adverse employment
decisions have been legally sanctioned even though there is authority in the
medical literature for the view that the risk of transmission from an infected
patient to a health care worker is much greater than the risk of transmission from
an infected health care worker to a patient. The case law, however, has
distinguished the physician-patient relationship as placing a special duty on the
physician "to do no harm" to the patient, with this special duty being cited in the
opinions finding the HIV-infected physician "not otherwise qualified."'" Such
a distinction has no basis in the statutory language of the ADA. While this issue
was raised by Bragdon in his arguments related to "direct threat," the Supreme
Court chose not to address the issue. It is likely that future litigation will involve
the matter of reconciling the direct threat analysis developed under Title III with
the "otherwise qualified" analysis under Title I of the ADA and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.
The Supreme Court's opinion, standing alone, does not provide assurance of
ADA protection for HIV infected persons who cannot show that they would
otherwise engage in reproductive activity, but for their HIV infection. The
elderly, post-menopausal women, homosexuals, males with vasectomies, females
with hysterectomies, other persons who are sterile, children, and those who have
chosen to be celibate might all fail to qualify under such a disability standard
unless other major life activities are recognized in which these individuals would
engage but for their HIV infection. Of course, the majority opinion hints that it
is likely that in a properly argued case, the Supreme Court would take a broad
view of major life activities impacted by HIV infection. Nevertheless, although
the majority in Bragdon clearly held that HIV-infection, whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic, is always an impairment under the ADA, the Court declined to
decide that a person with HIV infection always is a person with a disability.
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